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Foreword
With only seven percent of the world’s people but about half of its 
welfare payments, the European Union’s levels of inequality and 
absolute poverty are low in a global context. Nevertheless EU countries 
face social challenges. Unemployment remains high in a number of 
member states, while the intergenerational divide between the young 
and the old has widened. Social mobility is weak, in particular in the 
more unequal economies of southern Europe, limiting opportunities 
for the children of poor and disadvantaged families. 
Striving for fairness in economic development is crucial in order for 
societies to be stable and citizens not to feel disenchanted. This was 
why my colleague Zsolt Darvas and I attempted an analysis of inclu-
sive growth in Europe with a global perspective. With around 50 charts 
and many tables, we provide an anatomy of inclusive growth in the EU.
Poverty, defined as very low absolute income, is extremely rare 
in the European Union. Income inequality also tends to be low, 
compared to other parts of the world. We present new estimates of 
inequality in the EU as a whole and show that, perhaps contrary to 
perceptions, it has declined since 1994. However, measured on a coun-
try-by-country basis, income inequality has in some cases increased. 
Our analysis confirms its negative associations with lower social 
mobility, weaker educational achievements of children born into 
poorer families, worse health outcomes and higher unemployment. 
Moreover, Zsolt Darvas’ estimates confirm that high inequality and 
poverty boosted the ‘leave’ vote in the United Kingdom’s June 2016 
Brexit referendum, suggesting that perceived unfairness can lead to 
protest votes in referendums and elections. 
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Our data casts doubt on the popular hypothesis that inequality is 
an unavoidable counterpart of technological change that favours those 
with skills. While we find evidence that the demand for university 
graduates has increased significantly in recent years and that certain 
tasks, most notably manual and cognitive tasks requiring routine skills, 
have been automatised, we also find that in many European countries 
university graduates receive a smaller premium over the wages of 
lower-educated workers compared to the US, and the premium has 
fallen. Our results suggest that we should not fear the ‘new machine 
age’, but must instead equip the next generation of workers with skills 
that benefit from technology. Such skills are likely to emphasise social 
and creative intelligence.
European policymakers have a long to-do list to foster inclusive 
growth in Europe. Pressing tasks include improving access to quality 
education for all to ensure greater equality of opportunity. Welfare 
systems should be reformed for greater effectiveness in a number of 
countries, because the same amount of social spending often yields 
very different results in terms of inequality. A lower tax burden on low 
incomes would contribute to inclusive growth, as would a review of 
protectionism in certain segments of markets and unjustified rents. 
Designing fiscal policies so that fiscal adjustments do not disadvan-
tage the young and families, or undermine education and investment, 
is equally important. Last but not least, unemployment needs to be 
addressed. 
These policies mostly concern national policymakers. EU institu-
tions can highlight best practices and apply peer pressure to member 
states, but we warn that promising results without proper instruments 
could backfire and lead to a backlash against the EU if citizens perceive 
that promises are not being kept.
Guntram B. Wolff, Director of Bruegel
October 2016, Brussels
Executive summary
Years of crisis and stagnation have left Europeans worried about 
both growth and fairness. They have seen the impact of recessions 
on their communities, but they are well aware that hardship has not 
fallen equally on all shoulders. Policymakers need to strive to bring 
European economies back to robust growth, in order to meet promises 
of opportunity and prosperity. But that growth must also be fair if cit-
izens are not to grow disenchanted. This is why the concept of ‘inclu-
sive growth’ is so important and deserving of detailed investigation.
Growth is considered inclusive if it creates opportunities for all 
segments of the population and shares them fairly. To understand 
inclusive growth, we must first understand inequality. This can be 
inequality of opportunity in access to education, jobs, finance or the 
judicial system, for example. Or it can be inequality of outcomes, such 
as income, wealth, health and educational attainment. Both categories 
of inequality are central to discussions of inclusive growth.
Recognition is growing that inclusive growth matters: in specific 
countries, and in the European Union as a whole. At EU level, an 
inclusive economy is among the prominent targets of the Europe 2020 
strategy.
In this report we analyse inequality and inclusiveness in Europe, 
taking a global perspective. Our aim is to present a snapshot of the 
current situation and assess longer term trends in terms of growth and 
fairness in European economies and societies. Building on a thorough 
literature review, careful data collection/analysis and some economet-
ric estimates, we reach the following key conclusions:
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What are the EU’s main social challenges?
• The EU’s social problems are generally different from social prob-
lems in other parts of the world. Poverty, defined as a very low ab-
solute income, is extremely rare in the EU. Income inequality also 
tends to be low, compared with the emerging economies of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, and also with the United States.
• Nevertheless, EU economies are diverging in terms of social dy-
namics. Social indicators show that polarisation between the south 
and the north has widened since 2008. Several EU countries, in par-
ticular in the south, have suffered increases in material deprivation 
and unemployment (including youth unemployment and a greater 
share of children living in jobless households), and a growing 
intergenerational divide between the young and the old. Income 
inequality is relatively high in some EU countries, in particular in 
the southern EU.
• Unemployment has a negative impact on the living conditions of a 
large segment of society. It also has major negative consequences 
for medium- and long-term economic growth. Long spells of un-
employment erode skills and discourage labour market participa-
tion, thereby undermining countries’ long-term growth potentials.
• Youth unemployment is especially alarming. A long period of 
unemployment after graduation, when a young worker should 
acquire his or her first workplace skills, can undermine whole 
careers. This risks creating a lost generation, with trickle-down 
effects also for fertility rates. Moreover, when children grow up 
in families in which parents do not work for long periods or work 
irregularly, their opportunities are curtailed compared to children 
whose parents work.
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Why is inclusive growth important? 
• When assessing inclusive growth, poverty and income inequality are 
the two most relevant indicators, although there are many others, 
including non-monetary indicators. Income inequality and poverty 
have an impact on inequality of opportunity and prospects for social 
mobility, with major consequences for individuals and societies.
• Research shows that in most countries children growing up in 
poorer and disadvantaged families tend to underperform in school 
compared to their classmates from richer families. Educational 
underachievement then leads to low employability. Moreover, 
people with a low level of education tend to have worse health and 
live shorter lives. An economy cannot be regarded as inclusive if 
opportunities to progress depend on family background.
• Inequality and poverty also influence the prospects of social 
convergence across regions, generations and families belonging to 
different socio-economic groups. 
• Higher income inequality is associated with less intergenerational 
(or social) mobility: the children of poor families tend to become 
poor, while the children of rich families tend to become rich. The 
same result holds for educational achievements too. Nordic coun-
tries, such as Finland and Denmark, exhibit low income inequality 
and relatively high social mobility. Southern European countries 
such as Italy, but also the United Kingdom, are marked by high 
income inequality and relatively low social mobility.
• The literature about the impact of income inequality on long-term 
growth is mixed, but there is growing evidence that inequality was 
also a determinant of the unsustainable pre-2008 booms in the 
United States and in several European countries. Countries with 
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greater inequality tended to have higher household borrowing 
prior to the crisis, which led to weaker consumption growth during 
the crisis. The higher private debt rendered economies more vul-
nerable and contributed to the higher unemployment and higher 
levels of poverty.
• High levels of income inequality and poverty can also boost protest 
votes in referenda and elections. Our econometric estimates reveal 
that in the United Kingdom’s June 2016 Brexit referendum, in-
come inequality and poverty were factors that boosted the vote for 
‘leave’ – in addition to geographical differences and larger shares of 
less-educated and older people in certain UK regions. Our esti-
mates confirm that the young (who will dominate the population 
in the coming decades) and the well-educated (who may be better 
able to understand the benefits of EU integration) were more in 
favour of EU membership. 
Does technological change drive income inequality?
• There is no indicator of income inequality for the EU as whole from 
official statistical sources. Therefore we estimated the EU-wide Gini 
coefficient and other relevant indicators. Our calculations show 
marked differences in the development of inequality between the 
European Union and most other parts of the world, including the 
United States and emerging countries. In many parts of the world, 
income inequality increased in the past two decades, but Europe 
was different. Since 1994, there was a steady decline in net (after 
taxes and transfers) inequality in the EU until 2008, after which 
inequality remained broadly the same.
• In the EU and the United States, there has been a decline in 
the number of jobs for workers with low levels of educational                          
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attainment over the past 25 years. Meanwhile, there has been a tre-
mendous increase in jobs for workers with tertiary education, and 
this is the only job category that expanded after 2008, even in sev-
eral countries that were hit hard by the recent global and European 
financial and economic crises. While underemployment (when a 
worker takes a job for which they are over-qualified) is a prevailing 
phenomenon, it tends to be temporary.
• If a greater share of jobs is only open to tertiary-educated workers, 
it could contribute to greater inequality. This is the case if the skill 
premium (the potential for higher income that comes with higher 
educational achievement) is large and increasing. Several authors 
build on this and explain rising wage inequality through ‘skill-bi-
ased technical change’. This is the idea that technological progress 
is biased in favour of skilled workers and against unskilled workers. 
However, our data raises doubts about the relevance of this ex-
planation for Europe. There was a significant increase in the skill 
premium in the US and China, and a limited increase in Germany, 
but the skill premium has in fact declined in many other countries 
during the past two decades, including the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Spain, France, Sweden and Japan.
• Our analysis of the number of new graduates and the unemploy-
ment rate of tertiary-educated people does not support the claim, 
frequently made in the literature, that a reduced supply of univer-
sity graduates relative to demand has been a main reason for the 
increased skill premium in the US. Moreover, in OECD countries 
where the share of tertiary-educated workers is high, the skills 
premium of tertiary education tends to be relatively low. In fact, 
the United States is an exception to this trend and its relatively high 
share of tertiary-educated workers is associated with a relatively 
high tertiary education premium.
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• The income share of the top 1 percent of earners is a major con-
tributor to overall income inequality. However, in the US, a rather 
small fraction of the top 1 percent of earners comes from high-tech 
industries such as ICT and manufacturing. The bulk of top earners 
are lawyers, doctors, dentists and financial sector professionals. 
Some of these industries enjoy a relatively high level of protection, 
while the impact of technological change may still be comparative-
ly modest. Europe tells a different story. In many European coun-
tries a much higher share of the top 1 percent of earners than in the 
United States is in the manufacturing sector.
• Therefore, our comparison of countries suggests that even though 
technological change tends to favour those with greater skills, it is 
hard to see how it has contributed to rising inequality. Other factors 
such as redistribution and education policies or the regulation of 
certain professions may be more relevant. 
• The literature about the risk posed by the automation or ‘robotisa-
tion’ of jobs reaches mixed conclusions. Some authors conclude 
that the risk is high for many current jobs, but others conclude only 
a few jobs are at high risk. It is difficult to compare such estimates 
because of their differing assumptions and methodologies.
• By looking at European data, we conclude that the so-called ‘job 
polarisation’ hypothesis might be at work in Europe. This hypothesis 
posits that technology can replace human labour in routine tasks, 
be they manual or cognitive, but (as yet) it cannot replace human 
labour in non-routine tasks. According to this hypothesis, demand 
for labour increases for well-paid skilled jobs (such as profession-
als and managers), which typically require non-routine cognitive 
skills. Labour demand also increases for the least skilled low-paid 
jobs, which typically require non-routine manual skills and revolve 
around unpredictable interactions with people and the environ-
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ment, such as various services and sales jobs. Demand for labour in 
‘middling’ jobs, which require routine manual and cognitive skills 
– clerks, operators and assemblers, for example – will fall. By analys-
ing the largest countries in Europe, we find data that supports this 
hypothesis. 
• Looking ahead, if technology is able to start to cope with 
non-routine cognitive tasks, the next generation of workers must 
be equipped with skills that benefit from technology rather than 
being threatened by it. Such skills are likely to emphasise social 
and creative intelligence. Appropriate shifts in education policy 
are recommended.
National and European policies to foster inclusive growth
Tax, social, education and labour policies are almost exclusively 
national competences and are under the direct control of national 
policymakers, who face a number of challenges. The first is to foster 
social mobility. Early childhood education is key for social mobility 
and higher education increasingly important for employment. Second, 
there are major differences in the efficiency of welfare systems. In 
particular, welfare systems are often not efficient in reducing income 
inequality. Reforming welfare systems is particularly important in 
some southern European countries. A third issue is the progressivity of 
the tax system, which has generally come down. The tax system often 
puts too much burden on low income households. Fourth, while the 
skill premium in most European countries has not increased, increases 
in the US happen in sectors with less technological change. A review 
of the extent to which different sectors are protected in different 
countries could be a useful contribution in terms of addressing some 
unwarranted rents that accrue to top-income households. Fifth, the 
composition of fiscal consolidation was often biased against young 
families and education and also against investment. This had negative 
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implications for growth, while exacerbating inequality and the growing 
intergenerational divide. A sixth issue is to address (youth) unemploy-
ment which is an issue for national labour market policies alongside 
European and national macroeconomic policies.
The EU has set itself social targets. The EU can set targets but has 
few direct instruments to achieve them. Such normative power can 
be useful in increasing peer pressure but it can also lead to frustra-
tion as perceived promises are not kept. But the EU can play a greater 
role in tax policies and by using its regulatory power in setting certain 
social standards. 
To conclude, inclusive growth should be at the top of the political 
agenda. European countries are actually performing rather well in 
terms of reducing income inequality, though developments vary in 
different EU states. But policymakers need to address unemployment 
more forcefully, especially youth unemployment. Moreover, social 
mobility is rather weak in many countries (particularly in southern 
Europe and the United Kingdom). Countries should carefully review 
the evidence about the main obstacles to social mobility. In terms of 
EU-level policy, there is a good case for regulation where the EU has 
real competence. But it is undesirable to make promises and set goals 
in areas in which the EU cannot deliver because of its lack of compe-
tence or instruments.
1. Introduction
There is a growing recognition that economic growth in itself does 
not provide equal opportunities to different segments of society. In 
most countries disadvantaged people find it difficult to progress, as 
shown by, for example, Sen (2000), Atkinson (2005) and Silver (2007). 
Children growing up in disadvantaged families tend to underperform 
compared to their classmates from richer families (Van der Berg et al, 
2011; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn, 2000), while educational under-
achievement leads to low employability (Rutter, 1993; Bynner, 2000). 
People with low educational levels tend to be less healthy and live 
shorter lives (Wilkinson, 2003; Braveman and Gottlieb, 2014).
Economic growth that leads to increased inequality in different 
aspects of life could also be unsustainable. A high level of inequality 
might lead households to rely on debt financing to maintain living 
standards, a factor that might have been a significant driver of the 
housing boom in the pre-crisis period in the US, and the consequent 
bust (Rajan, 2012; Van Treeck, 2014). Greater inequality could reduce 
the level and duration of periods of growth (Ostry, Berg and Tsangarid, 
2014), and could also be linked to greater financial instability (Skott, 
2013; Vandemoortele, 2009). For the euro area, Darvas and Wolff 
(2014) showed that in countries with greater inequality, households 
tended to borrow more prior to the crisis, resulting in more subdued 
consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, 
high unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education 
undermine long-term growth and social and political stability.
The notion of inclusive growth refers to a broader concept of 
development, including various non-monetary aspects of life, such 
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as health, educational opportunities, employment prospects and 
possibly also environmental issues. An extensive academic literature 
has explored the reasons behind income inequality and its conse-
quences. Multinational institutions, such as the OECD, World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund and the World Economic Forum have 
played a pivotal role in defining conceptual issues, indicators and poli-
cies for fostering inclusive growth.
Inclusive growth is a top priority in the European Union’s overall 
strategy. The European Commission, for example, argues in its Europe 
2020 strategy, that “in a changing world, we want the EU to become a 
smart, sustainable and inclusive economy”1.  Other major economies 
have similar goals2. 
The EU’s social problems are generally different from social prob-
lems in other parts of the world. With one of the largest welfare states 
in the world, the concept of inclusive growth must be explored and 
defined differently in the EU than in many emerging economies. To 
illustrate the differences, Table 1 presents three simple indicators. 
Poverty, as measured by the share of people living on less than $2.50 a 
day, is practically non-existent in the EU, while the developing world 
still suffers massively from this problem. Income inequality, as meas-
ured by the Gini coefficient, is somewhat diverse in the EU, yet even 
the most unequal EU countries are somewhat more equal than the 
United States and much more equal than emerging and developing 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Only in terms of the third 
indicator reported in Table 1, unemployment, do some EU countries 
rank worse than most of the rest of the world.
1  http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. 
2  In China, the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-15) marked a shift from ‘pursuing economic 
growth’ to ‘sharing benefits of development among all people,’ and the goal of a har-
monious society is highlighted by the government. See for example http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/12/12/00035616
1_20131212171010/Rendered/PDF/revised08251900Box0382083B00PUBLIC0.pdf. 
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Table 1: Poverty and income inequality around the world (latest available data) 
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EU EU15 (ex. south & UK) 10 0.5 27 7.8
Southern EU 4 2.3 34 19.4
United Kingdom 1 0.5 35 6.2
Baltics 3 1.5 34 9.6
Other newer EU members 10 1.7 30 10.3
Non-EU United States 1 1.3 37 6.1
Non-EU advanced (ex. US) 7 0.3 29 4.8
China 1 19.3 53 4.1
Asia (ex. China & CIS) 19 23.6 40 4.5
Latin America 19 12.1 44 6.9
Africa 36 72.5 44 12.0
CIS (former USSR) 10 19.3 35 6.9
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank World Development indicators (poverty), the 
Standardised World Income Inequality Dataset (income inequality), International 
Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (unemployment rate). Note: Poverty refers to 
the percent of population living below $2.50 a day. Income inequality refers to the Gini 
coefficient after taxes and transfers. For each country and indicator, the latest available 
data is used, which is typically available for 2012 or 2013 for poverty and income ine-
quality and 2015 for the unemployment rate. Unweighted averages of country data are 
shown for country groups. EU15 refers to the EU member states before 2004. Southern 
EU refers to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Baltics refers to Estonia, Latvia and Lith-
uania. Other newer EU members are countries that joined the EU between 2004-13, 
excluding the three Baltic countries. 
The low level of absolute poverty and diverse and relatively lower 
levels of income inequality underline the different nature of social 
challenges in the EU. Darvas et al (2014) demonstrated that Europe’s 
social problems widened with the increase in unemployment and 
material deprivation in some parts of Europe. Polarisation between 
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the south and the north of the EU has increased, as well as between 
the young and the old. Hüttl, Wilson and Wolff (2015) show that there 
was increasing intergenerational polarisation during the economic 
crisis years. Piketty (2014), in turn, focuses on increases in wealth 
inequality. Such polarisations, along with differences in access to 
good jobs, good education and high-quality healthcare, call for a new 
policy focus in the EU.
Our aim is to study the importance and influence of inclusive 
growth in building Europe’s future and to draw some conclusions 
about how policymakers should respond. Chapter 2 briefly summa-
rises the inclusive growth literature with a focus on developed econo-
mies. Chapter 3 analyses the drivers of income inequality by assessing 
labour market developments and the possible role of skill-biased 
technical change in driving the skill-premium up. Chapter 4 focuses 
on the potential for social mobility in the European Union. We pay 
special attention to the effect on inclusive growth of the recent global 
and European financial and economic crises by studying who bene-
fitted and who suffered from the crisis. Finally, chapter 5 sets out our 
recommendations for national and European Union policies to foster 
inclusive growth.
2. Inclusive growth:                              
why it matters
2.1 Defining and measuring inclusive growth
OECD (2014) defines inclusive growth as “economic growth that cre-
ates opportunity for all segments of the population and distributes the 
dividends of increased prosperity, both in monetary and non-monetary 
terms, fairly across society”. Inclusive growth goes beyond one-dimen-
sional GDP growth. Jobs, skills, education, health, the environment and 
active participation in the economy and society also matter. The OECD 
emphasises that what is considered relevant for inclusive growth varies 
in different countries and circumstances. For instance, in developing 
countries, social connections and quality of institutions matter more, 
whereas social protection (such as access to services and unemploy-
ment insurance) tend to be more relevant in advanced countries.
Ianchovichina and Lundström (2009) emphasise that the main 
instrument of sustainable and inclusive growth is ‘productive employ-
ment’, reached through employment growth (new jobs, wages and 
self-employment) and productivity growth, which has the potential to 
lift the wages of the employed and the incomes of the self-employed. 
For Ianchovichina and Lundström (2009), inclusive growth should 
focus on the poor, especially on the part of the labour force that is 
trapped in low-productivity activities and/or completely excluded 
from the growth process. Ranieri and Almeida Ramos (2013) also 
underline the concept of ‘productive employment’, as well as the dif-
ficulties in understanding the complex interactions between growth, 
poverty and inequality.
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Measurement of inclusive growth ranges across a broad spectrum 
of indicators. OECD research suggests using wide-ranging indicators, 
including income and wealth, health status, work-life balance, envi-
ronmental quality, housing conditions and personal security. White 
(2012) presents a broad list of requirements for inclusive growth, such 
as lower income inequality, a reduction in absolute poverty, internalis-
ing the externalities of growth, reducing the North–South income gap, 
reducing inequality of opportunity (such as in access to education, 
jobs, finance and the judicial system) and greater space for emerging 
market economies in the governance of international financial institu-
tions. A few studies attempt to calculate a single indicator for inclusive 
growth, such as the ‘opportunity index’ of Ali and Son (2007) or the 
index based on the ‘social mobility curve’ of Anand, Mishra and Peiris 
(2013).
While there is a growing consensus that poverty and inequality 
themselves are not sufficient to characterise the inclusiveness of the 
growth process, these two indicators are generally considered to be 
the most relevant factors: see for example Habito (2009), Rauniyar and 
Kanbur (2010), Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven and Weeks (2000) and 
Ramos, Ranieri and Lammens (2013). 
2.2 Inequality and growth
Inequality of outcomes (such as income, wealth, health and educa-
tion) and opportunities (access to education, jobs, finance and the 
judicial system) are central to understanding how inclusive growth is. 
IMF (2015) highlights key factors driving inequality, such as:
• Technological change: inequality has also increased as growth has 
been accompanied by technological change that favours those with 
the right skills (skill premium).
• Trade globalisation: although trade has been an engine for growth 
in many countries by promoting competitiveness, high trade flows 
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are commonly cited as driving income inequality by lowering wag-
es for unskilled labour in advanced countries (though the empirical 
evidence is mixed).
• Financial globalisation: while it can facilitate efficient internation-
al allocation of capital and promote international risk-sharing, 
financial globalisation can increase income inequality in advanced 
and emerging market economies because of the concentration of 
cross-border financial claims in relatively higher-skill and technol-
ogy-intensive sectors, which pushes up demand for, and there-
fore wages of, higher skilled workers. Financial deregulation and 
globalisation has increased wages in financial industries, thereby 
contributing to increases in inequality.
• Financial deepening: financial development could benefit the rich 
in early stages (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenstrom, 2009), though 
it will likely also promote better access of households and firms to 
finance and thereby reduce income inequality.
• Changes to labour market institutions: more flexible labour market 
institutions can foster economic dynamism by reallocating resources 
to more productive firms and therefore provide better opportunities 
for skilled workers. On the other hand, greater flexibility can pose 
challenges to low-skilled employees, while the decline in trade union 
membership and increase in more temporary forms of employment 
can increase their vulnerability. 
• Redistributive policies: tax systems in some advanced economies 
have become less progressive over the last few decades. Rising pre-
tax income concentration has coincided with declining top margin-
al tax rates. 
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Greater inequality could affect economic growth in various ways 
(as various papers have already summarised, for example OECD, 2008, 
2011, 2014). Greater inequality and financial market imperfections 
might reduce the capacity of low-income households to invest in 
education, lowering economic growth (Galor and Zeira, 1993, 1998). 
Under-investment in human capital by poorer segments of society 
might reduce social mobility and adequate allocation of talent across 
occupations (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Fershtman et al, 1996; 
Owen and Weil, 1998). Greater inequality might also reduce growth if 
it leads to political instability and social unrest (Alesina and Perotti, 
1996; Knack and Keefer, 2000). If inequality becomes unacceptable for 
voters, they might insist on higher taxation and regulation and mis-
trust businesses, reducing incentives to invest (Bertola, 1993; Alesina 
and Rodrick, 1994).
On the other hand, greater inequality could increase growth if it 
provides incentives to work harder and take risks in order to capitalise 
on high rates of return (Mirrlees, 1971; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). High 
differences in rates of return for education might encourage more 
people to seek education. Higher inequality could foster aggregate 
savings and capital accumulation, because the rich consume relatively 
less (Kaldor, 1956; Bourguignon, 1981).
The empirical evidence for the impact of inequality on growth 
is inconclusive. Several papers have found that inequality reduces 
growth, while many others have concluded that it increases growth. A 
number of papers have concluded that the impact is insignificant or 
that earlier findings that seemed conclusive are not robust. 
For example, a generally negative relationship is established by 
Alesina and Rodrick (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Clarke 
(1995), Perotti (1996), Knowles (2005), Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides 
(2014) and OECD (2014). On the contrary, a positive relationship is 
found by, for example, Li and Zou (1998), Deininger and Olinto (2000), 
Forbes (2000) and Halter, Oechslin and Zweimuller (2014).
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Among the studies that found inconclusive results or concluded that 
earlier findings in the literature were not robust, Barro (2000), for exam-
ple, found that the relationship is insignificant for the whole sample 
(which includes 84 countries), but positive in rich and negative in poor 
countries. Castelló and Domenech (2002) found a negative relationship 
for the whole sample, but a positive relationship when income and 
human capital inequality are considered simultaneously. Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) found negative effects on growth resulting from changes 
in inequality in any direction. Voitchovsky (2005) found an insignificant 
relationship considering the whole sample, but a positive relationship 
at the top of the inequality distribution and negative at the bottom of 
the inequality distribution. The findings of Castelló (2010) were similar 
to the findings of Barro (2000): that there is a negative relationship for 
poor countries and a positive relationship for rich countries, though for 
the whole sample he found a negative relationship. 
Anderson and Maibom (2016) rationalise the mixed results of 
the literature. They argue that theoretically, there exists a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity only at the frontier of the possible set of 
combinations of economic performance and income equality availa-
ble to policymakers. However, there may be many historical, institu-
tional and political reasons why countries are not at the frontier, and 
these countries can improve efficiency and equity at the same time. 
Their empirical stochastic frontier analysis using data from OECD 
countries supports these theoretical predictions: the estimated frontier 
indicates a trade-off between efficiency and equity, but there are many 
countries well below the frontier and therefore a simple cross-country 
correlation would suggest a seeming positive relationship between 
efficiency and equity. By using a different frontier analysis and data 
from US states, Aghion et al (2015) report similar findings. They find 
significant correlation between top income inequality and growth in 
those US states which are close to the most productive US state (‘fron-
tier growth’), but negative correlation between top income inequality 
and non-frontier growth. 
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2.3 Social mobility
Higher inequality is found to be associated with less inter-generational 
mobility: the children of poor families tend to stay poor, while the 
children of rich families tend to stay rich. This association is described 
by the so-called ‘Great Gatsby Curve’ (Figure 1), which relates inter-
generational earnings elasticity (how much a child’s adult earnings 
vary from his/her parents’ earnings) to income inequality (Corak, 
2013; Andrews and Leigh, 2009)3. The higher this elasticity (that is, 
earnings of a worker correlate more with the earnings of his/her 
parents), the lower social mobility is. The results clearly indicate that 
greater inequality tends to be associated with a greater likelihood that 
economic advantage/disadvantage will be passed from parents to their 
children. For example, in some Nordic countries (Finland, Denmark, 
Norway), where income inequality is relatively low (Gini coefficient 
around 21-23), intergenerational earnings elasticity is also relatively 
low, below 0.2, implying relatively high social mobility. In contrast, 
in countries where income inequality is relatively high (Italy, United 
Kingdom, United States), intergenerational earnings elasticity is much 
higher and close to 0.5, implying relatively low social mobility. While 
there are differences in intergenerational mobility in different regions 
in each country, Bratberg et al (2015) found that the most socially 
mobile region in the US is substantially less mobile than the least 
mobile regions of Norway and Sweden. 
Educational achievement is a driver of social mobility. For the 
United States, Belley and Lochner (2007) concluded that even con-
trolling for cognitive skills, the strength of the relationship between 
family income and college attendance is persistent and even increases 
over time. Bailey and Dynarski (2011) found that the rate of college 
graduation increased by only 4 percentage points for low-income 
cohorts born in the early 1980s relative to cohorts born in the early 
3 According to Corak (2012) ‘The Great Gatsby Curve’ label was first used in a 2012 
speech by Alan Krueger, in his capacity as the Chairman of the US Council of Economic 
Advisors, evoking the 1925 novel by F. Scott Fitzgerald.
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1960s, while those born into high-income households increased by 
20 percentage points during the same period. Reardon (2011) showed 
that maths and reading score differences between the 90th and 10th 
percentiles did not change from 1950-70, but increased to 30-40 per-
cent between 1970-2001. 
Figure 1: The Great Gatsby Curve: more inequality is associated with less 
mobility across the generations 
Source: Reproduced with permission from Corak (2013), Figure 1.
An important reason for such a relationship is that richer parents 
can provide better educations for their children. Knudsen et al (2006) 
emphasised the importance of socio-economic status, including the 
quality of neighbourhoods and schools, which influences children’s’ 
cognitive abilities. Socio-economic status has an impact on success 
in primary school, which in turn influences success in high school 
and college, and subsequently the access to good jobs in the labour 
market. McLanahan (2004) found that children born to more-educated 
mothers are likely to be raised by older, more mature mothers who are 
working and have better paying jobs and who are thus able to support 
their children more, while children of less-educated mothers are likely 
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to make less significant gains and even incur losses in the parental 
resources available to them. Aghion et al (2016a) conclude that inno-
vation, particularly new entrants, is positively associated with social 
mobility, while Aghion et al (2016b) find that the probability of becom-
ing and inventors is strongly correlated with parental income, which 
correlation is mostly driven by the ability of richer parents to provide 
better education to their children. 
Another aspect is the skill premium. Aaronson and Mazumder 
(2008) and Mazumder (2012) found that the higher the returns from 
going to college, the lower the degree of intergenerational mobility. 
They showed that the correlation between returns from going to col-
lege and intergenerational mobility of earnings was quite strong in the 
United States from 1940-2000.
Some authors highlight that prospects for social mobility differ for 
different segments of society. For example, Bratsberg (2007) concluded 
that in Denmark, Finland and Norway (three countries in which social 
mobility is relatively high) being raised by a low-income father does 
not disadvantage children, but being raised by high-income father 
confers an advantage (ie intergenerational elasticity of income does 
not change for the lower part of the distribution, but changes for the 
top part). For the United States, Bratberg et al (2015) found particularly 
low upward mobility at the very bottom of the income distribution. 
Social networks can also reinforce inertia in income rankings 
within a society. For example, Datcher and Loury (2006) argued that 
in the United States, half of jobs are found through family, friends or 
acquaintances. Corak and Piraino (2010, 2011) and Bingley, Corak and 
Westergard-Nielson (2012) concluded that intergenerational trans-
mission of earnings is associated with intergenerational transmission 
of employers (even in more socially mobile countries like Canada and 
Denmark). Children of top earning fathers are more likely to be top 
earners even if they get a job with different employers to their fathers. 
Sweden, Canada and Denmark, even though generally equitable, show 
an existence of a ‘dynasty’ when it comes to the top 1 percent.
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Moreover, Solon (2004) also argued that public policy can either 
accentuate or dampen the influence of labour market inequality and 
intergenerational mobility. Public programmes that benefit the less 
well-off relatively more may increase social mobility4. A possible 
political reason for reduced intergenerational mobility might be that 
wealthy individuals capture the political system and thereby reduce 
more redistributive policies, which in turn lowers social mobility 
(Burtless and Jencks, 2003)5. 
2.4 Impact on politics: Brexit vote boosts case for inclusive growth
High inequality and poverty can boost protest votes in referenda and 
elections. 
In the United Kingdom’s Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016, 51.9 
percent of voters rejected the United Kingdom’s membership of the 
European Union. Did income inequality, poverty and unemployment 
contribute to ‘leave’ votes? To answer this question, we estimated 
some regressions to uncover the determinants of ‘leave’ votes and 
voter turnout. Full details of our regression analysis are presented in 
Annex 1, while here we summarise the key findings and conclusions. 
Using hard data from statistical offices (as opposed to using the 
results of opinion surveys) for 173 UK regions, our regression results 
confirm that younger and better-educated people voted for ‘remain’ in 
greater proportions and older and less-educated people tended to vote 
for ‘leave’. There was a clear geographical pattern in which Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and London were for ‘remain’. The actual presence of 
immigrants did not have a significant effect on the results, supporting 
4  For example, public spending on education directed at high-quality early childhood 
education and to primary and secondary schooling accessible for all is likely to benefit 
more families that are lower in the socioeconomic scale than public spending directed 
at high-quality private tertiary education accessible to only a few.
5  A counter-argument is expressed by Alessina and Glaeser (2004), who argue that in 
more unequal societies the median voter will tend to have a stronger preference for 
redistribution, implying higher social mobility.
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the conjecture of Mourlon-Druol (2016) that it was the perception that 
immigration could be a problem, rather than the actual presence of 
immigrants, that influenced the vote. Average household income did 
not play a role either; we adjusted for several socio-economic char-
acteristics of the regions. Turnout was lower among disadvantaged 
people and in the ‘remain’ strongholds: the young and residents of 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and London voted in lower proportions. 
Despite the clear overall vote for ‘leave’, EU leaders could take a 
positive message from the referendum result. The young (who will 
come to dominate the population) and the well-educated (who might 
be able to understand better the benefits of EU integration) were more 
in favour of EU membership.
A key contribution of our calculations is to show using regres-
sion analysis that in areas of the UK where inequality and poverty 
are higher, there were more ‘leave’ votes, even after controlling for 
socio-economic and geographic factors. This finding calls for more 
inclusive growth. In the UK, income inequality – a key indicator 
of inclusive growth – is almost the highest in the European Union. 
Theresa May, who became prime minister of the UK in the wake of the 
Brexit vote, rightly emphasised very strongly the importance of social 
reform to reduce inequality of opportunity (Asthana et al, 2016).
Overall, high levels of inequality and poverty undermine personal 
well-being and social cohesion, and can also boost protest votes in 
referenda and elections. This is another key lesson that politicians in 
other countries should learn from the Brexit vote.
3. Labour markets, inequality 
and technology
The key underlying theme from our literature survey and our analysis 
in the previous section is that inequality of opportunity, fuelled by 
poverty, inadequate access to good education, jobs and healthcare 
are likely to be detrimental not just to personal well-being and social 
cohesion, but also in terms of macroeconomic prospects and polit-
ical stability. Income inequality can be a major factor influencing 
the inequality of opportunity and the prospects for social mobility 
and convergence of social indicators among families with different 
socio-economic standings, age profiles and that live in different 
regions. In this chapter, we document the development of income 
inequality in the European Union as a whole, based on our novel 
estimates, and assess the potential drivers of income inequality. 
3.1 Income inequality: Europe is different
European countries are different from most countries in terms of how 
income inequality has developed. Unfortunately, income inequality 
indicators are not available from official statistical sources for the EU 
as a whole6. Therefore, in Darvas (2016b), we estimated for the EU the 
Gini coefficient of income inequality from 1989 to 2014. 
6 While Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical office, publishes Gini coefficients 
for 28 EU members and for various groups of countries within the EU, these Gini coef-
ficients are population-weighted averages of country-specific Gini coefficients, which 
are not the Gini coefficients that correspond to the combined income distribution of 
the countries. See Darvas (2016b) for more details. 
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Figure 2 shows a marked difference between the United States 
and the European Union in inequality over time. In the US, income 
inequality declined in the 1960s and remained broadly unchanged 
in the 1970s. Since then, however, there has been a steady increase 
in income inequality, both before redistribution (so-called ‘market’ 
inequality) and after taxes and transfers (‘net’ inequality). 
There was a sharp increase in EU-wide inequality from 1989-93, 
reflecting a large increase in inequality among the first 15 EU member 
states and among the 13 countries that joined the EU from 2004 
onward. The central and eastern European countries in the latter group 
suffered from massive output declines because of their transitions from 
socialist to market-based economies during this time, which widened 
the income gap between their citizens and those of western European 
countries, pushing up aggregate EU-wide income inequality. 
Nevertheless, the most notable feature of Figure 2 is the steady 
and remarkable decline in net income inequality in the 28 current EU 
countries from 1995 to 2008. This development differentiates the EU 
not just from the US, but also from most other countries. 
The decline in EU-wide net income inequality stopped in 2008 and 
income inequality has remained broadly stable since then. Therefore, 
the recent global and European financial and economic crises might 
have played a role in halting the 15-year long trend of declining net 
income inequality in the EU. 
Another notable development to be noted from Figure 2 relates to 
the differences between market and net measures of income ine-
quality. In the EU, market inequality jumped to a Gini coefficient 
level of about 51 in the early 1990s and has remained broadly stable 
since then. The EU’s social redistribution systems played a key role in 
achieving the declining trend of net income inequality between 1995 
and 2008. In the US, both market and net income inequality rose in 
the past four decades. Social redistribution in the US therefore has not 
played such an important role in containing the rise in net inequality. 
Interestingly, market inequality in the US increased to practically the 
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same level as the EU in 2010-14, yet net inequality is much lower in 
the EU, underlining the importance of redistribution. We will analyse 
redistributive issues in more detail in chapter 5.
Figure 2: Gini coefficient of market (before taxes and transfers) and net (after 
taxes and transfers) income inequality: comparing the EU as a whole with the 
US, 1960-2014
Source: Bruegel based on US data: the Standardised World Income Inequality Da-
tabase (SWIID) from Solt (2016); EU28 data: Darvas (2016b), which is based on the 
individual country data from Solt (2016); thereby the US and EU28 data reported in 
this figure are comparable. Note: A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality (ie 
incomes are perfectly evenly distributed) and a Gini index of indicates 100 perfect 
inequality (all incomes are owned by one person).
Unfortunately, missing data does not allow calculation of the EU28-
wide Gini index before 1989. In order to show inequality over an even 
longer term for some EU countries, Figure 3 reports Gini coefficients 
for the five largest EU countries compared to Brazil, China, Japan and 
the US. While there were some fluctuations, the Gini coefficient tended 
to be lower in France and Germany than in other countries. Italy, 
Spain and the UK are less equal than France and Germany, yet they are 
much more equal than the Brazil, China and the US. 
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Figure 3: Gini coefficient of net income inequality (after taxes and transfers), 
selected countries, 1960-2014 
Source: Bruegel based on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID). Note: A Gini index of zero represents perfect equality (ie incomes are perfect-
ly evenly distributed) and a Gini index of indicates 100 perfect inequality (all incomes 
are owned by one person).
While the EU as a whole, and individual EU countries, tend to 
be characterised by lower income inequality than the US and most 
emerging/developing countries, there is are significant differences 
between EU countries, as Figure 3 shows for the five largest EU coun-
tries. Figure 4 maps the inequality levels of EU countries between 
2010-14. Mediterranean countries, Baltic countries and the United 
Kingdom exhibit relatively high Gini coefficients, while Nordic coun-
tries and ‘core’ continental EU countries are characterised by lower 
income inequality levels. 
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Figure 4: Gini coefficient of net disposable income in the EU, average of 2000-14
Source: Bruegel based on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database 
(SWIID). Note: Gini coefficient is after taxes and social transfers.
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3.2 Long-term structural changes to labour markets: the EU and US 
are similar
Despite differing developments in net income inequality, there is 
a striking similarity between the EU and the US in terms of a major 
long-term change in the labour market: the decline in jobs with low 
education requirements and the increase in jobs with high education 
requirements. This development has major implications for social 
mobility. 
While the categorisation of jobs according to education require-
ments differs somewhat between the EU and the US, Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 show notable similarity.
The number of jobs for people with higher education has increased 
significantly and steadily in both the EU and the US, starting at least 
after 1992 (since when there is available EU data). The number of such 
jobs has practically doubled in two decades. It is really noteworthy that 
during the global and European financial and economic crises of the 
past few years, employment of highly-educated workers continued to 
increase in the EU, even in countries suffering from large increases in 
unemployment, such as Cyprus, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Portugal and 
Spain. In three other hard-hit countries, Estonia, Latvia and Greece, 
the employment of the highly-educated remained broadly stable. In 
the US, there was just a slight decline in the number of jobs requiring 
high-level educational attainment in 2009, since the increasing trend 
has resumed7.
7 An important aspect of the steady increase in jobs with tertiary-educated workers 
is underemployment: that is working in jobs that typically do not require a university 
degree. By analysing underemployment in the United States following the Great Re-
cession, Abel and Deitz (2016) conclude that recent underemployed college graduates 
were not forced into low-skilled service jobs, but into jobs that appeared to be more 
oriented toward knowledge and skills when compared to the distribution of jobs held 
by young workers without a college degree. Moreover, they also find that underem-
ployment is a temporary phase for many young graduates when they enter the labour 
market, because it often takes time for new graduates to find jobs suited to their 
education level.
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Jobs requiring medium-level qualifications also increased signif-
icantly after 1992 in both the EU and the US, but the growth of such 
jobs stopped in the EU in 2008 and after some decline, only a slow job 
growth has resumed in the US.
On the other hand, the number of jobs in the EU for people with 
lower qualification levels declined between 1992 and 20078 and 
dropped massively during the crisis. In the US, the number of such 
jobs was more or less stable from 1993 to 2007, after which there was a 
major decline.
Figure 5: Employment by educational attainment in the EU, 1992-2015 
(millions of jobs)
Source: Eurostat ‘Employment by sex, occupation and educational attainment level (1 
000) [lfsa_egised]’ dataset. Note: the solid line shows the aggregate of EU15 countries 
(EU members before 2004), which is available from 1992. The same-colour dashed line 
indicates the aggregate for 27 EU member states, which is available from 2000.
Therefore, the recent global and European crises have amplified 
the difference between the availability of jobs requiring high and low 
8 There were a few exceptions to this trend, like in Spain and Ireland, where the 
pre-crisis housing bubbles were associated with the creation of low-skilled jobs in the 
construction sector. However, the excess creation of such jobs proved to be unsustain-
able.
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levels of education, even though the divergence started at least 25 
years ago. 
Using data from the United States, Bitler and Hoynes (2015) report 
that lower income earners experience much greater income variabil-
ity than higher earners. Furthermore, this disproportionate effect of 
recessions on low earners was greater in the great recession of 2008-09 
compared to the previous 1980s recession. The vulnerability of low-
skilled workers likely applies in the EU too. 
The long-term decline in the number of jobs for low-educated 
workers, and the consequent vulnerability of those workers, underline 
the importance of upward social mobility. More and more children 
and young people need to attain higher levels of education, including 
those who were born to parents with low educational achievements.
Figure 6: Employment by educational attainment in the US, 1992-2015 (millions 
of jobs)
Source: US Census Bureau. http://data.bls.gov/pdq/SurveyOutputServlet. Note: An-
nual averages for employed persons 25 years and over.
Developments in China have been different, reflecting its different 
level of economic and social development (Figure 7). In 1997, almost 
100 million jobs were filled by illiterate people, declining to close 
to zero by 2014. The number of jobs for workers with only primary 
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education also declined considerably from 246 million to 143 mil-
lion between 1997 and 2014, possibly related to urbanisation and the 
decline in agricultural jobs. On the other hand, only 20 million jobs, 
less than 3 percent of total jobs, were occupied by people with college 
and higher degrees in 1997. The number of such jobs increased tre-
mendously to 112 million by 2014, reaching a share of 15 percent of all 
jobs. Among workers with college and higher education, the number 
of university graduates increased from 10 million in 2001 to 46 million 
in 2014. The number of jobs requiring junior and senior school qualifi-
cations also went up. It has to be noted, moreover, that the number of 
illiterate and semi-literate workers declined sharply from 90 million in 
1997 to 14 million in 2014.
Figure 7: Employment by educational attainment in China, 1997-2014 (millions 
of jobs)
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China. Note: Data for employment of universi-
ty graduates and above only available from 2001 onwards. China has 9 years of publicly 
funded compulsory education, which consists of 6 years of primary school and 3 years 
of junior school. After 9 years of primary and junior school, there is 3 years of senior 
school. After senior school graduation (equivalent to US high school education and EU 
upper-secondary education) people enter either college (equivalent to US and EU spe-
cialised and vocational education) or university (equivalent to US bachelor’s degree or 
higher and EU tertiary education).
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On the other hand, it is notable that the total number of jobs in 
China increased only by 11 percent from 1997 to 2014, which corre-
sponds to 0.6 percent per year job creation, while average GDP growth 
during the same period was 9.5 percent. 
3.3 Technological change and the skill premium
Recent economic research studying the impact of technology on the 
labour market emphasised the role played by skill-biased technical 
change, the idea that technical changes shifts production to technology 
that favours skilled over unskilled workers (see Katz and Autor, 1999, 
and Violante, 2008, for surveys of the literature). By increasing the pro-
ductivity of skilled workers, and thereby the demand for such workers, 
skill-biased technical change may explain rising wage inequality. 
The skill premium and/or returns from schooling refer to the 
gain that a worker gets by investing in higher education. It is calcu-
lated as the ratio of wages of the high-skilled workers to the wages of 
low-skilled workers. Autor (2014) notes the dramatic rise in the skill 
premium in the US and argues that this contributes substantially to 
the rise in income inequality. Figure 8 shows that the median weekly 
earnings of high-skilled workers continually increased during the 
1980s and 1990s, whereas the weekly earnings of those with primary 
and high school education experienced a decline. Since about 2000, 
however, the increase in the skill premium has stopped. 
Autor (2014) attributes the sharp increase in the skill premium in 
the US to:
• The decline in non-college employment in production, administra-
tive and clerical work; 
• The sharp rise in low-skilled labour supply and competition from 
the developing world; 
• The decline in the bargaining power of labour unions and reduc-
tions in top marginal tax rates. 
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Figure 8: Median weekly earnings by education (left hand scale) and the skill 
premium (right hand scale) in the US, 1979-2013
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Note: the sample is not longitudinal (ie not 
following the same people through time) and thereby compositional changes (eg the 
arrival of new workers with a lower wage) influence the median value. In Figure 10 we 
show the average real wage growth according to skill level, which is not a longitudinal 
sample either. Figure 10 suggests that there was some real wage increase even for low-
skilled workers (though such an average statistic is also influenced by compositional 
changes). Still, Figure 10 confirms that the skill premium has increased in the United 
States. 
However, the question remains of whether, in such analyses, 
education can be used interchangeably with skills, ie if we can cred-
ibly state that education translates into skill and thus has an impact 
on wages. The OECD Program for International Assessment of Adult 
Competences (PIAAC) provides an internationally compatible data-
base of adult cognitive skills and skills needed in the workplace, 
namely literacy, numeracy and problem-solving. The results of the 
survey indicate that cognitive skills differ greatly depending on edu-
cational attainment. Figure 9 compares the mean numeracy score of 
adults with lower than high school education to the scores of those 
who have obtained tertiary education. Workers with tertiary education 
have higher numeracy scores in all countries, particularly in the US 
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where the mean score difference is greatest at 82 points between those 
with less than high school education and those with college education. 
France ranks second with a 78 point gap.
Figure 9: Mean score on the numeracy test by educational attainment, 2013
Source: OECD PIAAC survey, 2013.
However, over time, the skill premium has not increased every-
where. As Figure 10 shows, in the United States, the wages of high-
skilled workers increased much more than the wages of low-skilled 
workers from 1995 to 2009. While such a development can also be 
observed in China and to a much lesser extent in Germany, exactly the 
opposite has happened in France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden and Japan, where the wages of high-skilled workers declined 
relative to the wages of the low-skilled, while in Korea wages increased 
broadly at the same rate in all three skill categories. Consequently, 
there are major differences in the level of skill premium. While it 
is around 2.5 in the US and China, the EU average skill premium is 
around 1.6, albeit with significant differences between EU countries 
(Figure 11). Turkey and Brazil have the highest skill premiums among 
the countries considered.
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Figure 10: Percent change in wage per hour worked from 1995-2009 (deflated 
by the consumer price index)
Source: World input output database, July 2014 release; Note: definition of skills 
follows 1997 ISCED level, where LOW encompasses primary education or first stage of 
basic education and lower secondary or second stage of basic education; MEDIUM is 
(Upper) secondary education and post-secondary non-tertiary education; HIGH is first 
stage of tertiary education and second stage of tertiary education.
One possible reason for the differences in the way skill premiums 
have developed is the supply of higher-educated workers. The supply 
of such people in a given year is composed of those who obtained their 
degrees earlier, those who obtained their degrees in the current year, 
the net immigration of people with university degrees, minus those 
who left the labour force because of retirement or any other reason. 
It is not easy to obtain data for each of these components, but we 
report two relevant indicators: the annual number of new graduates 
(representing the annual ‘home production’ of workers with univer-
sity degrees) and the unemployment rate among people with tertiary 
education (which indicates the tensions in the labour market).
The number of new graduates has increased steadily in the EU and 
in the US (Figure 12). Interestingly, the total percent increase from 
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1998 to 2014 was very similar: 85 percent in the US and 90 percent 
in the EU. In our view, this slight difference in the number of new 
graduates cannot explain the major differences in the EU and US skill 
premium trends. On the other hand, there was a huge increase of new 
graduates in China, where the skill premium increased dramatically. 
Figure 11: Relative earnings of workers by educational attainment (earnings of 
medium-educated workers = 100), 2013
Source: OECD Education at a glance, 2015. Note: Adults with income from employ-
ment, medium education refers to upper secondary education and equals 100. (*) Data 
for 2012. (**) Data for 2011. (***) Data for 2010.
Moreover, the unemployment rate among people with tertiary 
education should be a useful indicator, reflecting the tightness of the 
labour market. Figure 13 shows that there is a statistically significant 
association between the unemployment rate among people with ter-
tiary education and the change in the skill premium: a lower unem-
ployment rate is associated with a higher increase in the skill premium, 
as expected. But the increase in the skill premium in the United States 
was much faster than the regression relationship would have implied. 
Figure 13 therefore suggests that the supply-demand conditions were 
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not the key determinants of the major skill premium increase in the 
United States, and that there were other reasons.
Therefore, relative to the EU and China, the data does not support 
the claim that a reduced supply of university graduates relative to 
demand has been one of the main reasons for the increased skill pre-
mium in the United States.
Figure 12: Number of new tertiary education graduates per year, millions, 
1998-2014
Source: Eurostat, OECD and Chinese Ministry of Education. Note: Tertiary education is 
classified as ISCED 5 and above/bachelor’s degree and above. 
In terms of the wage skill premium, Hanushek et al (2014) find 
that on average one standard deviation increase in numeracy score is 
associated with an 18 percent increase in wages. In Sweden, the Czech 
Republic and Norway the returns range from 13-15 percent, while in 
the US, Ireland and Germany the wage returns to skill average 24-28 
percent, thus showing significant differences between countries. 
Felgueroso et al (2010) document the reasons for the falling wage 
skill premium in Spain in two periods: from the mid-1980s and from 
the mid-1990s to 2010. The authors conclude that despite the signif-
icant increases in the number of graduates with tertiary education, 
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Spain recorded a falling wage skill premium starting from the begin-
ning of 1990s. Over-education and a continuous mismatch between 
education and occupation explain the falling returns on education 
among high skilled workers. Structural changes to the Spanish labour 
market with a marked increase in temporary employment also con-
tributed to the falling premium. Temporary contracts have affected 
workers of all ages and educational levels, in particular the middle 
skilled, which affects their employment and wages in later stages of 
their careers.
Figure 13: The correlation between the average rate of unemployment of those 
with tertiary education and the change in the skill premium, 1998-2009
Source: Eurostat, OECD. Skill premium is calculated from World Input-Output 
database.
We note that the United States is also an outlier in terms of the 
relationship between the share of tertiary-educated workers and the 
tertiary education premium: in OECD countries where the share of 
tertiary-educated workers is high, the tertiary education premium 
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tends to be relatively low (Figure 14). But the United States and 
Ireland are exceptions to this trend and the relatively high share of 
tertiary-educated workers is associated with a relatively high tertiary 
education premium. On the other hand, Italy, where income inequal-
ity is relatively high, is an outlier on the other side: the very low share 
of tertiary-educated workers is associated with a rather low tertiary 
education premium.  
Figure 14: Share of tertiary-educated workers and their relative earnings, 2013
Source: OECD, Education at a glance 2015. Note: Workers with medium education= 
100. Data for Netherlands: 2010; France and Italy: 2011; Australia, Canada, Finland, 
Japan, Poland, Spain: 2012.
Finally, we report data on the composition of the top 1 percent of 
income earners. If technological development was the key driver of the 
skill premium, then we would expect many high-tech sector workers 
to be in the top 1 percent. This is not really the case for the US: many of 
the top earners are lawyers, doctors and financial service employees, 
and very rarely ICT sector workers (Figure 15). Rothwell (2016) argues 
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that these high-earning sectors enjoy high levels of protection in the 
US and thereby enjoy unjustified rents relative to their skills.
Figure 15: Industries with the most top 1% earners in the United States
Source: Rothwell (2016).
Europe is different from the US in terms of the composition of the 
top 1 percent. As calculated by Denk (2015), after finance and insur-
ance, manufacturing is the second industry with about 18 percent 
of the top 1 percent of earners, and ICT also ranks prominently. In 
Germany, manufacturing sector employees account for 34 percent 
of the top 1 percent of earners. Therefore, in Europe a larger share of 
technology-intensive sector workers are privileged to be in the top 1 
percent, compared to the US. 
To sum up, our comparison of countries suggests that even though 
technological change tends to favour those with greater skills, it is 
hard to see in the data how it has contributed to rising skill premia and 
consequent income inequalities. Most likely, other factors were more 
important, such as redistribution and education policies or regula-
tion of certain professions. This result is in line with the findings of 
Anderson and Maibom (2016), who argue that political changes can 
explain the movements of the United States toward higher efficiency 
and lower equity during recent decades. 
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Figure 16: Industries with the most top 1% earners in the European Union
Source: Denk (2015). Note. Employees in the public administration are not available 
for all countries and are therefore removed from the sample for cross-country compar-
ison. Germany is excluded from the average since its industry classification is different.
3.4 Technological change and the risk of ‘robotisation’
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2013) argue that technology can replace 
human labour in routine tasks, whether manual or cognitive, but (as 
yet) cannot replace human labour in non-routine tasks. Combining 
these two strands, Goos and Manning (2013) argue for the UK that 
the impact of technology leads to rising relative demand in well-paid 
skilled jobs, which typically require non-routine cognitive skills, and 
rising relative demand in low-paid least-skilled jobs, that typically 
require non-routine manual skills. At the same time, demand for ‘mid-
dling’ jobs, that have typically required routine manual and cognitive 
skills, will fall. The authors call this process ‘job polarisation’.
Acemoglu and Autor (2011) found similar results for the US and 
concluded that technological change increased the demand for skilled 
labour. Technology was incorporated into the subset of core job tasks 
previously performed by middle-skill workers, causing substantial 
change. When differentiating employment growth by occupation, one
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can see similar developments also in Europe (Figure 17). The number 
of high-education jobs such as managers, engineers and
Figure 17: Employment growth, 1995-2015, by occupation
Source: Eurostat. *data for Sweden starts only in 1997. Note: Top left panel: Clerks 
include office clerks (eg secretaries and keyboard-operating clerks, library, mail and 
related clerks, etc) and customer services clerks (eg cashiers, tellers, client information 
clerks). Top right panel: Craft and related trades workers include extraction, building 
trades, metal, machinery, precision, handicraft, craft printing, food processing, wood 
treaters textile and related trades workers, while operators and assemblers include sta-
tionary-plant operators, machine operators and assemblers, drivers and mobile plant 
operators. Bottom left panel: professions included are service workers and shop and 
market sales workers, agriculture, fishery and related labourers, and labourers in min-
ing, construction, manufacturing and transport. Bottom-right panel: professions in-
clude legislators, senior officials, managers and various professionals and technicians 
(including physical, mathematical, engineering science, life science, health, teaching, 
business, finance, legal, social science and other professionals, police inspectors and 
detectives). See the complete classification here:  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/docu-
ments/1012329/6070763/ISCO88.pdf/192120ae-49cb-4f24-bfbc-06f054471e3b. 
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health professionals, is growing, while the number of middle-edu-
cation jobs (clerks, machine operators, assemblers) is declining. By 
contrast, the number of low-education service occupations, such 
as shop workers, which are non-standard and difficult to replace by 
automatisation, is growing. Looking ahead, a second wave of roboti-
sation is on its way, in which intelligent robots will more and more be 
capable to carrying out high skill level jobs. In recent years, a series of 
studies has revived the debate about robotisation taking over jobs. Frey 
and Osborn (2013) in particular sparked a debate by claiming that 47 
percent of US jobs are at risk of being automated. Bowles (2014) redid 
these calculations for the European labour market, and found that on 
average, 54 percent of EU jobs are at risk of computerisation. 
By contrast, Arntz et al (2016) argue that one of the major limita-
tions of Frey and Osborn is that they view occupations rather than 
tasks as being threatened by automation. They therefore focus on 
the task-content of jobs, and find that in the US only 9 percent of 
jobs (as opposed to 47 percent) are potentially automatable. Figure 
18 shows their results by country. Breaking down the risk according 
to educational attainment (Figure 19), one can see that low-edu-
cated workers will likely bear the brunt of technological change 
related adjustment costs.
What these estimates imply for policy is clear: if we believe that 
technology will start to be able to cope with non-routine cognitive 
tasks then we must equip the next generation of workers with skills 
that benefit from technology rather than being threatened by it. Such 
skills are likely to emphasise social and creative intelligence, which 
suggests that appropriate shifts in education policy are surely required 
in order to meet the challenge of automation.
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Figure 18: Potential for automation of jobs, OECD countries
Source: Arntz et al (2016) based on the Survey of Adult Skills. 
Figure 19: Share of people with at risk of automation of their jobs by educational 
level and country
Source: Arntz et al (2016) based on the Survey of Adult Skills. 
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3.5 Wage share and globalisation
Wages as a share of GDP have been falling in advanced countries, 
including in the EU (Figure 20). There is a vivid debate in the academic 
literature on the underlying reasons. A falling labour share can be 
regarded as a concern for inclusive growth because the distribution of 
capital income is very unequal in society. As a result, a falling labour 
share will lead to a decline in income for a large part of the population, 
accentuating inequality. Some blame globalisation and the integration 
of low-wage developing countries into world trade. Karabarbounis and 
Neiman (2014) show that the share of national income going to labour 
has been falling for several decades. They explain the falling labour 
share as a consequence of technological development that increase 
the productivity of capital relative to labour. However, their results 
assume an elasticity of substitution between capital and labour that is 
greater than 1, a hypothesis also advanced by Piketty. This elasticity of 
substitution is at odds with large parts of the empirical literature (for a 
discussion see Lawrence, 2016). Most of the empirical literature finds 
that this elasticity is smaller than 1, which would imply that capital 
and labour are not substitutes but complements. To the best of our 
knowledge, this issue has not been further investigated for the EU. In 
particular its implications for economic developments in the euro area 
remain unexplored. We leave this for further research.
Figure 20: Wages as a share of GDP
Source: Ameco database. Note: Wage share in GDP denotes the compensation per 
employee as percentage of GDP at market prices per person employed.
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4. Prospects for social mobility 
in Europe
The Great Gatsby Curve (Figure 1) shows that higher income inequality 
is associated with less social (or intergenerational) mobility. The indi-
cator of social mobility, the elasticity between parental earnings and 
their children’s adult earnings, is relatively high in Italy and the United 
Kingdom, and much lower in Denmark and Finland. France, Germany 
and Sweden are in between. 
Unfortunately, other European Union countries are not included 
in Corak (2013), on which this Great Gatsby Curve is based. Moreover, 
given that the calculation of intergenerational earnings elasticity 
requires decade-long data, the Great Gatsby Curve in itself does not 
allow the assessment of changes over time in intergenerational earn-
ings elasticity. 
Given that social mobility is a major aspect of inclusive growth, in this 
section we look at further indicators that might describe social mobility. 
4.1 Poverty
Poverty in the EU is different to poverty in developing and emerging 
countries. The level of poverty as measured by an income of less than 
$2.50 a day is close to zero in the EU (see Table 1 in the introduction). 
Therefore, poverty has to be measured differently in the EU. 
A widely-used indicator is the so-called ‘at risk of poverty’ indi-
cator, which is one of the three indicators for which the EPSCO 
(Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council) 
set targets in the context of the Europe 2020 Strategy. This indicator 
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measures the share of people with a net income after social transfers 
of below 60 percent of the national median equivalised disposable 
income. However, as first noted by Darvas and Tschekassin (2015), 
even though the word ‘poverty’ is part of the name of this indicator, it 
is not measure of poorness, but a measure of income inequality: the 
correlation coefficient between this indicator and the Gini coefficient 
of income inequality is very high at 0.9, as Figure 21 indicates9. There 
could be good reasons to aim for a reduction in income inequality, 
yet it is unfortunate that the main EU target indicator for this goal is 
inaccurately named.
In the EU, the most suitable indicator of poverty is the so-called 
severe material deprivation rate, which represents the proportion of 
people who cannot afford at least four of nine basic items, including 
utility bills, warm food, adequate heating or a car (see definition in the 
note to Figure 22)10. 
The first panel of Figure 22 shows that poverty rates differ greatly in 
different EU countries. The rate is higher in the countries that joined 
the EU in 2004 and after. It increased significantly during the crisis in 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. On the other hand, in ‘core’ 
EU15 countries, the poverty rate has been relatively stable at about 5 
9  Eurostat’s glossary also notes that “this indicator does not measure wealth or poverty, 
but low income in comparison to other residents in that country, which does not necessari-
ly imply a low standard of living”. Furthermore, the differences between the national 
thresholds (which are used to calculate the at-risk-of-poverty-rate) are so huge that 
they further underline the inappropriateness of this indicator for assessing poverty 
trends in Europe. For example, after taking prices into account, someone at the nation-
al threshold in Austria (who is regarded ‘poor’ in Austria according to this indicator) 
can consume twice as much in goods and services as someone at the national thresh-
old in the Czech Republic (who is regarded ‘poor’ in the Czech Republic according to 
this indicator).
10 The nine items are: 1) (arrears on) mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire 
purchase instalments or other loan payments; 2) one week’s annual holiday away from 
home; 3) a meal with meat, chicken, fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 
4) unexpected financial expenses; 5) a telephone (including mobile phone); 6) a colour 
TV; 7) a washing machine; 8) a car and 9) heating to keep the home adequately warm.
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percent on average and there was hardly any change during the crisis. 
The second panel of Figure 22 shows poverty rates according to 
education level. Clearly, poverty is much more widespread among 
low-educated people and they suffered during the crisis, while              
highly-educated people have low levels of poverty, has and this did 
not change much during the crisis years. 
Figure 21: Correlation between the Gini coefficient of income inequality and the 
at-risk-of-poverty indicator
Source: Bruegel using data from Eurostat. Note: both indicators are averaged over 
2007-2015. The correlation coefficients between the two indicators in each year be-
tween 2007 and 2015 are: 0.92, 0.90, 0.88, 0.89, 0.85, 0.85, 0.87, 0.83 and 0.92. The cor-
relation coefficient between the 2007-2013 time averages of the two indicators is 0.90. 
The at-risk-of-poverty indicators is ‘At risk of poverty rate (cut-off point: 60 percent of 
median equivalised income after social transfers)’, while the Gini coefficient is the ‘Gini 
coefficient of equivalised disposable income’.
The third panel of Figure 22 shows poverty rates according to age 
group. The striking feature is that poverty is much more common 
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among children than among the elderly, while for people of working 
age, the rate in between. The gap between young and old widened 
during the crisis: while it was a benign development that elderly 
people faced only a small increase in poverty during the crisis, and 
the poverty rates of the elderly are now well below pre-crisis rates, it is 
especially worrying that children suffered a large increase in poverty 
during the crisis years and the current levels of poverty among chil-
dren remain relatively high.
Figure 22: Severe material deprivation rate in the EU, 2005-15
Source: Eurostat. Note: The severe material deprivation rate represents the proportion 
of people who cannot afford at least four of the nine following items: 1) (arrears on) 
mortgage or rent payments, utility bills, hire purchase instalments or other loan pay-
ments; 2) one week’s annual holiday away from home; 3) a meal with meat, chicken, 
fish (or vegetarian equivalent) every second day; 4) unexpected financial expenses; 5) 
a telephone (including mobile phone); 6) a colour TV; 7) a washing machine; 8) a car 
and 9) heating to keep the home adequately warm.
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Figure 23: Change in severe material deprivation rate by educational                       
attainment, change from 2008-2013 
 
Source: Eurostat. Note: Highest level of education refers to first and second state of 
tertiary education and lowest level of education refers to pre-primary, primary and 
lower secondary education. The X axis shows the change in the severe material depri-
vation rate of those having the lowest level of education and Y axis shows the change 
of the same rate but of those having the highest level of education (from 2008 to 2013). 
The solid line indicates the same values on the two axes, that is, in countries to the 
right of this line people with low education levels suffered more than people with high 
education levels. 
Figure 23 compares the increases in the severe material depriva-
tion rate of low-educated and highly-educated people between 2008 
and 2013. Clearly, the lowest educated groups experienced a greater 
increase in their rate of severe material deprivation compared to the 
highest educated groups in most countries, the exceptions being 
Ireland, Romania, Slovenia, Austria and Poland. Poland and Austria 
saw reductions in the rate of material deprivation for both educational 
categories, while in Romania and Slovenia the rate of severe material 
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deprivation declined for the lowest educated groups, but rose for the 
highest educated groups.
4.2 Education
A crucial factor for upward social mobility is the ability of a child to 
attain a higher level of education than his/her parents. In disadvan-
taged families, the highest rate of return in early childhood devel-
opment comes from investing as early as poosible, because skills 
beget skills in a complementary and dynamic way, as highlighted by 
Heckman (2012). Figure 24 shows for European countries the educa-
tion levels of children whose parents have a low level of education. 
There are considerable disparities with Malta having the biggest share 
of low-educated children whose parents similarly have low education, 
followed by Portugal, Luxembourg and Italy. In contrast, in the UK 
and Finland the share of children obtaining a high level of education 
despite having low-educated parents is high.
Figure 24: Highest level of education of children whose parents have low 
education, age group 25-59, 2011
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 25 shows the association index, which measures the per-
sistence of low education in parents and their children (see the note 
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to the figure for explanations). This persistence is high in Croatia and 
Bulgaria, whereas in Estonia, Denmark and Finland there is a low level 
of persistence of low education.
Figure 25: The association index, low-education parents having low-education 
children, age group 25-59, 2011 
Source: Eurostat, Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage statistics. Note: The 
association index is calculated as an odds ratio and measures how strongly the low 
level of education of adults is related to the low level of education of parents compared 
to the high level of education of parents. Odds are expressed as the probability of an 
event occurring divided by the probability of the event not occurring. The odds ratio is 
a tool to show how strongly having or not having a certain property in the population is 
related to having or not having another property in that population. 
OECD (2011) highlighted the association between the socio-eco-
nomic status of parents and the educational achievement of children. 
A one unit increase in the PISA index of social, cultural and economic 
status is associated with a 38 score point difference in reading perfor-
mance (Figure 26). On average, according to the OECD, 14 percent 
of the variation in students’ reading scores can be explained by their 
families’ socio-economic status. The highest value is observed in 
Hungary, where 26 percent of the variation in students’ reading scores 
can be explained by the parental socio-economic status, whereas in 
Iceland and Estonia, only 5-8 percent of the variation can be explained 
by students’ socio-economic status. Students in Shanghai-China, 
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Korea, Finland, Canada and Japan have above OECD average reading 
performance and at the same time below-average impact of parental 
socio-economic background on children’s school performance. By 
comparison, in Belgium and New Zealand students score high in read-
ing performance and their socio-economic background has an above 
average impact on their reading performance. Interestingly, three of 
the highest performers, Shanghai-China, Korea and Finland all exhibit 
a below-average impact of socio-economic background on children’s 
reading performance. 
Figure 26: Relationship between students’ reading performance and                
socio-economic background 
Source: Education at a Glance, OECD Pisa database 2009. Note: Impact of socio-eco-
nomic background (plotted on the vertical axis) is measured by standardized PISA 
index of social, cultural and economic status based on the socio-economic informa-
tion provided by students regarding their parents. The index shows the percentage 
of variation in students’ performance explained by their parental socio-economic 
background (parental education, occupation, number of books in the house etc) The 
horizontal axis shows reading scores. 
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Finally, we highlight that the negative association between income 
inequality and the inter-generational transmission of disadvantage 
applies to learning outcomes, as demonstrated by Sandefur (2015) for 
a sample of 52 countries. He measured the inter-generational trans-
mission of learning outcomes by looking at the correlation between 
the wealth of parents and the reading and maths scores of children 
as measured by PISA scores, which corresponds to the Great Gatsby 
Curve for learning outcomes. Figure 27 clearly demonstrates that 
there is a strong correlation: in more unequal societies, the wealth of 
parents is more relevant for educational outcomes. This relationship 
is stronger in the global sample, but also visible within the European 
Union.  
4.3 Health
Regional data for 20 EU countries shows that the relationship between 
household disposable income per capita and life expectancy at birth 
is generally positive (Figure 28). However, panel A of Figure 28 suggest 
that the relationship is non-linear. To better represent non-linearity, 
panels B and C separate regions where disposable income per capita is 
below $15,000 from those where it is above $15,000. 
Per-capita income has a strong positive relationship with life expec-
tancy for lower income groups for which disposable per-capita income 
is $5,000 to $15,000. Among the 20 EU countries considered, the 
lowest life expectancy is recorded in Central Estonia at 72.6 years with 
corresponding income per capita of $6,898 followed by the regions 
of Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic. By contrast, 
the relationship between income and life expectancy diminishes for 
regions where per-capita income is above $15,000.
Interestingly, in countries with high income differences within 
regions, such as the UK, Spain and Italy, the differences in life expec-
tancy are relatively small, suggesting that the regional differences shown 
by Figure 28 arise primarily from differences between countries. 
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Figure 27a: The Great Gatsby Curve for reading test scores
Source: Sandefur (2015) for intergenerational transmission and SWIID for Gini coefficient. 
Note: Malta and Cyprus are missing due to data limitations.
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Figure 27b: The Great Gatsby Curve for maths test scores
Source: Sandefur (2015) for intergenerational transmission and SWIID for Gini coefficient.
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Figure 28: Regional household disposable income per capita (2005 US dollars) 
and life expectancy, 2013
Source: OECD Regional well-being statistics and Eurostat. Note: Correlations across 
184 regions of 20 EU countries.
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Educational levels are clearly associated with life expectancy. Figure 
29 shows that better-educated people enjoy longer life expectancy 
at age 25 for all countries for which this data is available. The biggest 
difference in expectancy depending on education level is observed 
for Estonia, where remaining life expectancy of the most educated 
group at age 25 is 57.2, compared to 43.4 for the lowest educated group. 
Estonia is followed by Bulgaria, where the gap is 9.8 years between the 
most and the least-educated groups. In contrast, southern European 
countries such as Italy and Portugal tend to have smaller gaps.
Figure 29: Remaining life expectancy at 25 years by educational attainment, 
2013 
Source: Eurostat and US Census Bureau. Note: Rest of the EU (13 countries) omitted 
because of missing data. For US, less than primary, primary and lower secondary edu-
cation is split between high school graduates and no high school due to the non-avail-
ability of combined data.
Countries with higher public health expenditure per person tend 
to have lower proportions of individuals reporting bad and very bad 
health (Figure 30). This suggests that the rich, who can afford to spend 
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more on health, are healthier than the poor, who can afford less. 
Figure 30: Share of persons 16+ reporting bad/very bad health relative to sick-
ness/health public expenditure per person 
Source: EU-SILC, self-perceived health and Eurostat social protection statistics.
Obesity is another aspect of health. Rates of obesity do not correlate 
much with income inequality (Figure 31), but are strongly associated 
with educational achievement levels: well educated people are less 
obese than low-skilled people (Figure 32). 
Infant mortality is another indicator related to income level. Figure 
33 shows that infant mortality per 1000 births is higher in regions 
where income per capita is lower. The figure suggests a strong rela-
tionship for regions with income levels of less than about $10,000 per 
capita, while above this income level there is no further decline in 
infant mortality with an increase in income. 
BE
BG
CZ
DK
DE
EE
IE
GR
ES
FR
HR
IT
CY
LV
LT
LU
HU
MT
NL
AT
PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
FI
SE
UK 
IS
NO
CH R2 = 0.3404
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000
Sh
ar
e 
of
 p
er
so
n
s 
re
po
rt
in
g 
ba
d 
an
d 
ve
ry
 
ba
d 
h
ea
lt
h
Sickness/health expenditure in PPS
60 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 26
Figure 31: Correlation between the rate of obesity in men and women and the 
Gini coefficient, 2012
Source: OECD, Obesity update 2014. Note: % of population aged 15 years and over.
Figure 32: Obesity rates in the EU by level of education 
Source: Eurostat. Note: Lowest level of education refers to primary, pre-primary and 
lower-secondary level of education. Highest level of education refers to first and sec-
ond state of tertiary education.
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Figure 33: Infant mortality rates per 1000 births relative to regional household 
disposable income per capita in 264 EU regions, average rate for 2003-2013
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, NUTS 2 regional data, 25 countries, 264 regions 
excluding 4 French overseas départements. Note: disposable income per capita in 
purchasing power standard.
4.4 The intergenerational divide
Panel C of Figure 22 showed that severe material deprivation among 
the young has increased relative to poverty among the elderly. There 
are various other indicators suggesting that the intergenerational 
divide is on the rise in the EU.
Figure 34 reports the percentage point change from 2008 to 2014 of 
the indicator ‘share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion rate’. 
As we have argued, this is not an indicator of poverty, but a measure 
of income inequality. Consequently, Figure 34 should not be read as 
showing an indicator of poverty, but rather, as showing whether the 
young and the old have moved up or down relative to other segments 
of society. The figure clearly highlights that in most EU countries the 
old have experienced a substantial reduction while the young have 
seen a substantial increase in this indicator, suggesting that the relative 
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income position of the old has improved, while the relative income 
position of the young has deteriorated. The position of the young has 
deteriorated especially in Greece, Spain, Hungary, Luxembourg and 
Malta. 
Figure 34: Change in the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 
age group, 2008-2014
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Croatia is omitted because of missing data.
Young people in Europe have been impacted more by unemploy-
ment than old people (Figure 35). While unemployment rates among 
young people (defined in Figure 35 as aged 20-29) were higher than 
among older workers even before the crisis, the increase during the 
crisis was much more significant for the young. Panel B of Figure 35 
also highlights that lower-educated people faced higher unemploy-
ment rates even before the crisis and they suffered more during the 
crisis.
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Figure 35: Unemployment rate in the EU by age group and level of education
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat’s Labour Force Survey.
A) Unemployment by age groups, EU27, 2000-15
B) Unemployment by level of education, EU27, 2000-15
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Since young people have the option to study or participate in train-
ing, Figure 36 shows the so-called NEET indicator (not in employment, 
education or training). This indicator is significantly different for differ-
ent EU countries. While the share of NEETs in the Netherlands is only 
7.4 percent of the total youth population aged 18-24, in Italy the figure 
is as high as 29 percent, an alarming proportion. In general, southern 
European countries and central and eastern European countries have 
higher shares of inactive youth compared to other EU countries.
Figure 36: Share of young people not in employment, education or training, 
aged 18-24, in the EU, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, 2015
Source: Eurostat. Note: Young people aged 18-24 years not in employment, education 
or training (NEET) as a percentage of total population in the respective age group.
The share of youth NEETs also varies in different regions within 
countries. Figure 37 shows the regional minimum, maximum and 
median NEET values for EU countries. The lowest share of NEET 
youth is in south Netherlands (6.3 percent), while in Sicily, 42.1 per-
cent of people aged 18-24 fall into the NEET category. Intra-country 
differences are striking particularly for southern European countries. 
For example, in Italy, the province of Bolzano-Bozen has the lowest 
share of NEET youth in the country with 11.7 percent, well below 
Sicily’s 42.1 percent. 
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Figure 37: Share of young people not in employment, education or training , 
aged 18-24, by large regions within the EU, 2014
Source: OECD, Regional statistics. Note: The chart shows the maximum, minimum and 
the median values by large regions within countries. The named regions are those with 
the highest NEET values within each country.
Finally, we highlight that in regions with greater income inequality, 
youth unemployment tend to be higher. This relationship is especially 
strong for Italy and Spain, as Figure 38 shows. 
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Figure 38: Relationship between the Gini coefficient and youth unemployment 
rate by regions, 2010 
Source: Eurostat.
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5. National and European              
Union policies for fostering 
inclusive growth
The EU is often perceived to be on the wrong side of the inequal-
ity and inclusive-growth debate. It is seen as pushing the inte-
gration of markets and allowing the off-shoring of production to 
other countries, without properly taking care of the losers from 
‘Europeanisation’ and globalisation. 
Our assessment of inclusive growth provides a more nuanced pic-
ture. In particular, we find that income inequality in the EU is among 
the lowest in the world. For the EU as a whole, the Gini coefficient 
has been falling since the mid-1990s. This is evidence of the power of 
integration and the convergence of EU countries, in particular the con-
vergence of the eastern European countries with the more developed 
EU countries. But the data also shows that within countries, income 
inequality has tended to slightly increase in recent years. Moreover, 
the countries of southern Europe in particular are characterised by 
relatively high levels of income inequality.  
Tax policy and social policy are almost exclusively national compe-
tences in the EU. Similarly, labour laws or education policies, which 
are of central importance if individuals in our societies are to achieve 
their full potential, are national-level policies. Most of the instru-
ments that directly influence the inclusiveness of growth are thus in 
the hands of national policymakers. We therefore first explore those 
national policies before discussing EU policies.
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The first question concerns the adequacy of national policies for 
fostering social mobility. A crucial national policy is education: early 
childhood education has a decisive role for children and we have 
shown that children born to disadvantaged families are particu-
larly affected if their education is inadequate. Typically, educational 
performance depends on the educational levels of the parents, but in 
some north European countries this is less the case than in southern 
European countries and the United Kingdom. The expansion of jobs 
with tertiary-educated workers (the only job category that increased 
since 2008 both in the EU and the US) highlights the crucial role of 
education in social mobility.  Beyond the general point that reduced 
income inequality is likely to improve social mobility, these results 
point to the importance of education system reform to make upward 
mobility more feasible. Moreover, the education system must equip 
the next generation of workers with skills that benefit from technology 
rather than being threatened by it, especially if technology will start to 
be able to cope with non-routine cognitive tasks. Such skills are likely 
to emphasise social and creative intelligence, which suggests that 
appropriate shifts in education policy are required in order to meet the 
challenge of automation.
A second question concerns the efficiency for addressing inequality 
of national redistribution systems. Figure 39 shows that a given level of 
social expenditure can lead to very different reductions of inequality 
in a cross-section of EU countries. Similarly, taxes on labour income 
reduce income inequality to different degrees. This suggests that 
the efficiency of national redistribution schemes varies widely. For 
example, Greece and Sweden dedicate similar amounts of resources to 
social expenditure, yet Sweden achieves a reduction in market income 
inequality of almost 50 percent while Greece only achieves 30 percent. 
Surely, reform of national redistribution schemes must be a top prior-
ity if income inequality in southern Europe is to be addressed.
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Figure 39: Correlation between the reduction of market income inequality 
thanks to the social redistribution system and two fiscal indicators, average for 
2000-14
Source: Updated from Darvas and Wolff (2014) using data from The Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) and Eurostat. 
A third issue is the extent of redistribution and how progressive tax 
systems are. In the past three decades, the top statutory personal income 
tax rate has been cut in most OECD countries. The average for 23 OECD 
countries was 66 percent in 1980, falling to 46 percent in 2010. In the same 
period, the number of personal income tax brackets has been reduced 
from an average of 14 in 1981 to around five by 2000. Most likely, these tax 
system changes contributed to lower progressivity of income taxes, which 
may have been one of the reasons behind increases in (after tax) inequal-
ity in a number of countries. Still, Figure 40 suggests that there are major 
differences between countries in terms of their top income tax rates. It is 
notable that the countries with the highest top income tax rates (Sweden, 
Belgium and Denmark) tend to be characterised by relatively low income 
inequality, suggesting that tax policies, and in particular how progressive 
the income tax code is, have implications for (post-tax) inequality. 
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Figure 40: Top personal income tax rates (%),selected OECD countries, 
1981-2010
Source: OECD. Note: Average figures are based on the 24 countries for which data was 
available for the full period. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, for which data 
is not available for earlier years, are not included in the average.
Fourth, we have documented that unlike in the US and China, 
the skill premium in most European countries has not increased in 
the past two decades. This casts some doubt on the hypothesis that 
skill-biased technical change is the main reason for the increase in skill 
premia in the US. Rather, protection of certain sectors might be one of 
the reasons behind the increase. Most of the top 1 percent of income 
earners in the US are not in sectors that have seen high degrees of 
technological change, but are often in professions, such as lawyers or 
doctors. A careful review of how protected different sectors are in dif-
ferent European countries could be a useful contribution to addressing 
some of the inequality issues that arise out of rents accruing to the top 
income earners.
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A fifth important question concerns more recent economic policy 
decisions in the EU and in particular, fiscal adjustment strategies 
during the recent crisis. Beyond its speed, the composition of fiscal 
consolidation is crucial for influencing social conditions. In response 
to the crisis, EU countries have cut public investment spending sig-
nificantly. The fiscal multiplier is estimated to be comparatively high 
for this expenditure category (see for example Heppke-Falk, Tenhofen 
and Wolff, 2010, for estimates for Germany). The cuts therefore had 
a strong effect on GDP and, consequently, on employment. Social 
spending was broadly maintained. However, Table 2 shows that the 
distribution of social spending changed significantly. In particular, 
expenditure for pensions was sustained or even increased, while 
expenditure for families and education was cut. This has been particu-
larly true in the countries that faced the greatest fiscal pressures. 
A sixth and major issue concerns youth unemployment and unem-
ployment more generally. EU countries are not doing well in that area 
– also not in international comparison. Of course, there is a national 
institutional aspect to youth unemployment. In some countries, the 
ratio of youth unemployment to total unemployment is higher than in 
others. This suggests that in these countries, the labour market institu-
tions are particularly unfavourable towards the young. However, there 
is also a broader macroeconomic dimension. Youth unemployment 
and unemployment in general increased massively in the course of the 
crisis. The slow resolution of the crisis, and the depth and the length of 
the recession have taken a major toll on the prospects of the young. Part 
of the answer to this problem has to be a more growth-friendly macro-
economic policy mix. This is one of the important policy areas in which 
national and European policy responses need to be closely linked. 
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Table 2: General government expenditure by function, % change 2009-12 (in 
current prices and constant exchange rates)
Share Percent change in current prices, 2009-2012
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Total general 
government 
expenditures
100 4 -12 1 6 -3 7
Interest payments 5 23 14 32 19 164 22
Broad services 17 -2 -12 -11 2 -15 -1
Economic affairs 9 -5 -45 5 -6 -20 -4
Environment 
protection
2 -5 -26 -8 -4 -6 21
Health, recreation 17 4 -20 -7 8 -6 12
Education 11 2 -14 -10 5 -7 8
Old age 20 10 0 8 10 15 13
Family and children 4 0 -19 -10 3 -14 1
Housing 1 12 -30 6 13 23 20
Unemployment 4 0 11 14 -5 13 -11
Sickness and 
disability
6 7 -7 -1 9 -5 12
Other social 
protection
5 7 -11 5 9 26 8
Memorandum: 
inflation
  8 6 8 7 12 10
Source: Bruegel using Eurostat’s ‘General government expenditure by function’ 
(COFOG) database. Note: Belgium, Croatia, Slovakia and Romania are not included 
because of lack of data; we report data for the aggregate of the remaining 24 countries 
of the EU (EU24). Country groups as described in Figure 1. For the Baltic States, the 
2008-12 period is shown, because fiscal consolidation started earlier in these coun-
tries. The aggregates for countries with different currencies were calculated using con-
stant exchange rates (the average of 2009-13) and therefore exchange rate fluctuations 
do not affect the values shown. Broad services include: general public services except 
interest payments, defence, public order and safety and community amenities.
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European policies also matter for inclusive growth. Macroeconomic 
policies are important in this respect. The crisis has taken a heavy toll 
on European labour markets. Macroeconomic policies in the euro area 
are the result of a common monetary policy delivered by the European 
Central Bank, and of 19 national fiscal policies. We have shown 
elsewhere that the resulting policy mix is not always favourable to 
growth. In particular when monetary policy is constrained by the zero 
lower bound, better coordination of national fiscal policies could help 
improve growth and job prospects in the euro area. 
But beyond macroeconomics, the EU has set itself ambitious targets 
on inclusive growth. The Europe 2020 Strategy launched in 2010 aims 
to create the conditions for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
Smart growth is defined as developing an economy based on knowl-
edge and innovation.  Sustainable growth is defined as promoting a 
resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy. Inclusive 
growth is defined as fostering a high-employment economy that deliv-
ers social and territorial cohesion11.
The EU’s quantifiable headline targets for inclusive growth include: 
1. Placing 75 percent of the population aged 20-64 in employment, 
especially women, the young,  older and low-skilled people and 
legal migrants;
2. Better educational attainment: reducing school drop-out rates to 
below 10 percent, and for at least 40 percent of 30-34 year-olds to 
complete tertiary education (or equivalent);
3. Reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclu-
11 Inclusive growth is defined as “empowering people through high levels of employ-
ment, investing in skills, fighting poverty and modernising labour markets, training and 
social protection systems so as to help people anticipate and manage change, and build a 
cohesive society. It is also essential that the benefits of economic growth spread to all parts 
of the Union, including its outermost regions, thus strengthening territorial cohesion. It is 
about ensuring access and opportunities for all throughout the lifecycle”.
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sion by 20 million12.
Table 3: Progress towards the EU2020 targets 
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Employment rate 
of population aged 
20-64, %
70.3% 68.6% 68.4% 68.4% 69.2% 70.1% 75%
E
d
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ti
on
Reducing school 
drop-out rates to 
below 10%
14.7% 13.4% 12.7% 11.9% 11.2% 11.0% <10%
At least 40 percent 
of 30-34 year-olds 
completing tertiary 
education, %
31.1% 34.8% 36.0% 37.1% 37.9% 38.7% ≥40%
P
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er
ty
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n
d
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l 
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u
si
on
Reducing the 
number of 
people at risk of 
poverty and social 
exclusion by 20 
million, million 
people
116.2 119.6 122.5 121.6 120.9 - 96.2
Source: Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Eu-
rope_2020_indicators_-_executive_summary. 
Where do Europe’s headline targets for inclusive growth stand as of 
2016? Table 3 summarises some of the key indicators.
12 As we demonstrated in chapter 4, the at-risk-of-poverty indicator is in fact an indi-
cator of income inequality and thus the targeted reduction of the number of people at 
risk of poverty actually aims to reduce within-country income inequalities.
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In its stocktaking communication on the Europe 2020 targets, the 
European Commission (2014) states that progress towards the tar-
gets has been “mixed”, and that the crisis had led progress to stall and 
had “exacerbated the differences in member states,” in particular in 
employment levels and R&D spending. Among the numerical targets 
of the inclusive growth agenda, only the targets for education appear 
likely to be reached by 2020. The EU can define many goals but it has 
few instruments under its direct control to achieve these social goals. 
The EU aims to boost inclusive growth through two flagship initiatives 
and various, but rather small, funds, summarized in Box 1. Different 
European institutions monitor progress and make policy recommen-
dations. Yet almost all the policy recommendations must be imple-
mented by national policymakers. Darvas and Leandro (2015) have 
shown that the implementation of European recommendations by 
national policymakers is on average very low.
Perhaps more important than the various small funds is European 
Union regulation and its normative power, through which it defines 
and benchmarks performance to highlight good practices imple-
mented by certain countries that were beneficial for improving upward 
social mobility. But the EU can also play a legislative role, for exam-
ple by establishing certain rights when services are provided across 
borders. One of the more controversial issues is certainly the Posted 
Workers Directive, which sets the norms for the working and social 
conditions of workers who are temporarily posted to another EU coun-
try by their employer when their employer provides a certain service 
in that country13. Views diverge within the EU on whether the directive 
provides adequate protection of workers’ rights and the conditions for 
fair competition. The EU also wishes to develop a European Pillar of 
Social Rights for monetary union14.
13 See Sapir (2015) and Darvas and Vaccarino (2016). 
14  http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-economic-and-monetary-union/
towards-european-pillar-social-rights_en. 
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Box 1: Flagship initiatives and EU funds to boost inclusive growth.
Agenda for new skills and jobs
Why focus on employment and skills? How to boost employment and skills?
• Shrinking  workforce as a result of 
demographic change;
• Overall low employment rate 
(particularly for women 63 percent 
vs. 76 percent men; older workers 
46 percent in the EU vs. 62 percent 
in the US and Japan);
• Shorter working hours compared 
to the US and Japan;
• High youth unemployment 
brought about by the crisis;
• 80 million people with low and 
basic skills;
• By 2020, 16 million jobs will require 
high qualifications, 12 million 
fewer jobs requiring low skills;
•  Need for new skills.
• Help individuals learn new skills to 
adapt to the labour market;
• Collectively modernise the labour 
market to raise employment, 
productivity and sustainability of 
the social model.
European platform against poverty
Why focus on poverty? How to fight poverty?
• Even before the crisis, 80 million 
people at risk of poverty, 19 million 
children;
• 8 percent do not earn enough to go 
out of poverty.
• Economic, social and territorial 
cohesion;
• Respect for human rights of 
those living in poverty and social 
exclusion;
• Provide support, training and help 
the poor find jobs and have access 
to social benefits.
The European Union has some funds that can directly promote social 
goals. Besides the European Investment Bank, the European Social Fund 
(ESF) is the main financing tool to promote employment, education and 
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social inclusion. Between 2014 and 2020, the ESF will provide €80 billion (in 
current prices) including €6 billion to address youth unemployment through 
the Youth Guarantee schemes. There is also a small (the annual budget of 
the fund is around €150 million) European Globalisation and Adjustment 
Fund (EGF) set up in 2006 to help workers who were made redundant 
because of structural changes in the world economy and financial and 
debt crises to find new employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Other initiatives include the EU Programme for Employment and Social 
Innovation (EaSI) and Erasmus+, which will run from 2014 to 2020 and has 
a total budget of €14.7 billion. The programme complements the education 
and employment of youth pillar of Europe 2020. The Fund for European Aid 
for the most Deprived (FEAD) 2014-20 aims to complement the Europe 
2020 target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social 
exclusion by 20 million but its budget is only €4.5 billion for the 2014-2020 
period.
EU-wide initiatives also entail significant political risks. Defining 
social goals without controlling the instruments to achieve them can 
lead to a backlash against EU integration because citizens feel that 
promises made by the EU are not being delivered. 
Finally, the EU is increasingly active in the area of tax policy. On 30 
August 2016, following the results of an in-depth state aid investigation 
started in 2014, the European Commission concluded that Ireland 
granted undue tax benefits of up to €13 billion to Apple. The decision 
is based on state aid grounds: the Commission argues that two tax 
rulings issued by Ireland effectively granted Apple preferential treat-
ment, which amounted to state aid. The Commission ordered Ireland 
to recover up to €13 billion (plus interest) from Apple, but the decision 
is controversial and will be challenged in court.
The Apple case coincides with a sense among citizens that for far 
too long too little has been done to ensure tax fairness. But state aid 
controls cannot be the instrument of choice to address tax competition 
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problems. Certain issues can be addressed relatively easily. For exam-
ple, repealing the Interest and Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC) would 
allow countries to levy source taxes and prevent an erosion of the tax 
base. Making progress towards more tax coordination is more com-
plicated. For example, discussion on a common consolidated tax base 
for corporate profits has been slow at best. Rebalancing government 
revenues away from labour taxes towards corporate taxes, potentially 
more progressive consumption taxes and inheritance taxes could be a 
way of achieving more inclusive growth in the EU and would certainly 
contribute to a perception of greater fairness.
To conclude, inclusive growth should be at the top of the political 
agenda. European countries are actually performing rather well in 
terms of reducing income inequality, though developments vary in 
different EU states. But policymakers need to address unemployment 
more forcefully, especially youth unemployment. Moreover, social 
mobility is rather weak in many countries (particularly in southern 
Europe and the United Kingdom). Countries should carefully review 
the evidence about the main obstacles to social mobility. In terms 
of EU-level policy, there is a good case for regulation where the EU 
has real competence. But it is undesirable to make promises and set 
goals in areas in which the EU cannot deliver because of its lack of 
competence or instruments.
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Annex 1: Econometric analysis 
of the June 2016 Brexit vote 
(derived from Darvas, 2016a)
On 23 June 2016, 51.9 percent of voters rejected the United Kingdom’s 
membership in the European Union. We estimate some regressions 
to uncover the determinants of ‘leave’ votes and voter turnout, and in 
particular, to assess if inequality, poverty and unemployment contrib-
ute to ‘leave’ votes. 
Opinion polls and post-vote analyses (for example Lord Ashcroft 
Polls, 2016, and Burn-Murdoch, 2016) suggested that older, less-ed-
ucated and poorer people tended to vote for leave. Geography also 
seems to have played a major role: while the share of ‘leave’ votes was 
55.5 percent in England outside London and 52.5 percent in Wales, 
it was the minority position at 44.2 percent in Northern Ireland, 40.1 
percent in London and 38.0 percent in Scotland. And while immigra-
tion was one of the hottest topics in the Brexit debate, Mourlon-Druol 
(2016) noted that there was no automatic link between the presence of 
immigrants and the share of leave votes.
A simple correlation analysis (which was done in previous analyses 
of this issue) can provide useful insights, but does not prove causal-
ity. A correlation between two variables could be caused by a third 
variable, while a zero correlation does not exclude causality between 
two variables. There are interactions between indicators, which makes 
it difficult to interpret a correlation coefficient. For example, younger 
people tend to be better educated, while older people tend to be richer. 
The proper tool to assess the factors that influenced the ‘leave’ vote is a 
regression analysis that jointly considers various determinants. It also 
allows the importance of the various factors to be assessed.
We therefore use a regression analysis. As well as looking at age, 
education, income, immigration and geographical factors, we analyse 
the possible influence of three social indicators: income inequality, 
poverty and unemployment.
Instead of using data from opinion surveys, which are typically 
conducted by asking a few thousand people and therefore are subject 
to sampling errors, we use socio-economic data published by UK sta-
tistical agencies (see the data description in the annex). For example, a 
more recent opinion poll concluded that the turnout among the young 
was almost double than what was suggested by the first opinion polls 
conducted after the referendum (Helm, 2016). The data we use is not 
subject to such uncertainties related to opinion polls.
Regressions
We estimate two types of regression: one aims to uncover the deter-
minants of the share of the ‘leave’ vote, while the other explores the 
reasons behind voter turnout. We use various social and economic 
variables as possible determinants. 
We also include dummy variables for Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
Wales and London in the regressions, because of clear geographical 
differences in voting behaviour. Furthermore, inner London is very dif-
ferent from the rest of England: disposable income is more than twice 
as high as in the rest of the UK, the share of people with university 
degree is almost twice as high and the share of immigrants is almost 
four times as high.
For our calculations, we aggregate the data for the 173 NUTS3 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, 3rd level) regions of 
the UK. Thereby, we estimate cross-section regressions for these 173 
regional units. 
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Determinants of ‘leave’ votes
We wish to include the shares of both the young (aged from 20-34 
years) and the old (65 years and older) in the resident population, but 
these shares strongly correlate with each other and it is thus not wise 
to include them jointly (because of the so-called multicollinearity 
problem). Similarly, the shares of people with a degree and people 
with no qualification strongly correlate. Therefore, we estimate four 
versions of the regression, corresponding to the 2x2 options of age and 
educational attainment (Table 4).
 Table 4 allows a number of conclusions to be drawn out about the 
social, economic and geographical factors that influenced the share of 
‘leave’ votes in UK regions:
• The parameter estimate of the share of young people is negative, 
implying that a higher share of young people is associated with few-
er ‘leave’ votes. The point estimate of the parameter of the young 
is -0.5 in the first model, implying that a 1 percentage point higher 
share of the young (eg 21 percent instead of 20 percent) is associat-
ed with a 0.5 percentage point lower vote for ‘leave’. 
• In contrast, the estimated parameter of old people is positive, con-
firming that old people tended to vote for ‘leave’.
• The share of the workforce with a degree was a major factor for 
‘remain’ (since the parameter is negative), while a greater share of 
people with no qualification supported ‘leave’. 
• It is noteworthy that the share of young people positively correlates 
with the share of people with a degree, most likely because the num-
ber of university graduates increased over time; older people had 
fewer opportunities to obtain a degree when they were young. Yet 
our regression results show that the shares of both the young and the 
well-educated had a statistically significant impact on the results. 
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• Disposable income per inhabitant does not have a statistically 
robust effect. When we estimate a simpler regression model which 
includes only the four regional dummy variables (Scotland, North-
ern Ireland, Wales and London), the parameter estimate of dispos-
able income is -0.13, suggesting that people in poorer areas tended 
to vote for ‘leave’: a 10 percentage point lower income than the UK 
average is associated with a 1.3 percentage point higher share of 
‘leave’ votes. However, in the four regression models reported in 
Table 4, the sign of the parameter estimate of disposable income 
varies, suggesting that average income is not a robust determinant 
of ‘leave’ votes. A possible reason for the lack of a robust effect of 
disposable income per capita is that it has a high positive correla-
tion with the share of people with a degree and a strong negative 
correlation with the share of people without qualifications: well 
educated people tend to earn more. Yet when both education and 
income are included in the regression, education turns out to be 
statistically significant, while income does not.
• The estimated parameter of the Gini-coefficient of income inequal-
ity is positive and statistically significant. The parameter estimate is 
about 0.9, implying that 1 percentage point higher income inequal-
ity (eg 35 instead of 34) boosted the share of ‘leave’ votes by about 
0.9 percentage points. In our view this is a relatively large magni-
tude highlighting the importance of income inequality. 
• The poverty rate is also robust and statistically significant, with a 
parameter estimate of about 1, implying that a 1 percentage point 
higher poverty rate boosted the share of ‘leave’ votes by 1 percent-
age point. This result highlights the importance of poverty as a 
determinant of ‘leave’ votes. 
• The parameter estimate of the unemployment rate is statistically in-
significant, suggesting that beyond the influence of inequality and 
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poverty, unemployment did not play an additional role in the votes. 
• The share of non-UK born population is also not significant ac-
cording to our estimates. This suggests that the actual presence of 
immigrants did not really play a role. A possible explanation for this 
finding is that the share of non-UK born population correlates pos-
itively and very strongly with three other indicators included in the 
regression model: the share of young people, the share of people 
with a degree, and average income, implying that immigrants also 
go to economically more dynamic areas. Our results therefore show 
that after controlling for these socio-economic factors, immigration 
does not have an additional impact. 
• The four area dummy variables are all statistically significant with 
negative parameters. For Scotland, the parameter estimate is about 
-20. This implies that after controlling for socio-economic char-
acteristics, the share of leave votes in Scotland was 20 percentage 
points lower than in England outside London. The same parameter 
for Northern Ireland is about -15, for Wales it is about -6 and for 
London it is about -10. Clearly, beyond socio-economic factors, 
geography also played a major role in voters’ choices.
Finally, let us highlight that the regression fit is quite accurate. The 
coefficient of determinant (R2) is 0.85 for the first and third regres-
sions, which is quite high given that we use a cross-section sample. 
When we include only the four area dummy variables, the R2 is 0.51, 
highlighting that the socio-economic variables in the model explain 
much share of the variability of votes across the 173 regions. Figure 41 
shows that in most of the 173 regions, the fitted value by the regression 
tracks the actual votes remarkably well.
84 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 26
Table 4: Regression estimate for the determinants of the share of ‘leave’ votes
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D
Share of population aged 20-34 -0.49 -0.95    
  [-4.0] [-6.6]    
Share of population aged 65 and over 0.45 0.69
[3.2] [3.7]
Share of population with a degree -0.97   -1.05  
  [-11.9]   [-13.5]  
Share of population without qualification 0.6 0.6
[4.9] [5.0]
Disposable income per inhabitant 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.09
  [1.9] [-3.2] [2.0] [-3.3]
Gini coefficient of income inequality 0.77 0.89 0.93 1.24
[2.6] [2.4] [3.1] [3.1]
Poverty rate 1.00 0.85 1.06 0.95
  [3.0] [1.9] [3.1] [2.0]
Unemployment rate -0.14 -0.06 -0.34 -0.48
[-0.7] [-0.2] [-1.7] [-1.6]
Share of non-UK born population -0.02 0.01 -0.05 -0.12
  [-0.3] [0.1] [-0.6] [-1.2]
Scotland -19.64 -19.99 -19.92 -20.73
[-17.9] [-14.2] [-18] [-13.7]
Northern Ireland -14.61 -17.15 -14.13 -17.38
  [-6.5] [-6.0] [-6.1] [-5.5]
Wales -5.30 -6.82 -6.00 -8.39
[-3.9] [-3.9] [-4.3] [-4.5]
London -8.84 -11.71 -9.27 -12.78
  [-2.9] [-3.0] [-3.0] [-3.1]
R2 0.85 0.76 0.85 0.72
Source: Bruegel. Note: the sample includes the cross section of the 173 UK regions; 
t-ratios are reported in brackets below the point estimates; the regression includes a 
constant too. A parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at 10 percent 
significance level if the absolute value of the t-ratio is larger than 1.7.
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Figure 41: Shares of ‘leave’ votes in the 173 UK regions and the fitted values by 
the estimated regression 
Source: Bruegel. Note: regions from 1-133 are from England, regions from 134-145 are 
from Wales, regions from 146-168 are from Scotland and regions from 169-173 are from 
Northern Ireland. Inner London is from 80-88, while outer London is from 89-100. The 
first regression (Model A) of Table 4 is used. 
Who voted?
I also estimated the four versions of the regression for studying the 
determinants of voter turnout (Table 5).
Table 5 offers interesting insights into voting inclinations:
• Turnout was lower in areas where young people are a higher share 
of the resident population. Therefore, the young, the main support-
ers of ‘remain’, abstained more from voting. 
• By contrast, older people (many of whom are ‘leave’ supporters) 
cast their votes in a higher proportion.
• People with a degree (‘remain’ supporters) tended to vote in higher 
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proportions, while people without qualifications (‘leave’ support-
ers) abstained more from voting. 
• Average disposable income in a region was not a statistically signifi-
cant determinant of the turnout.
• Among the three social indicators, inequality contributed positive-
ly to the votes, while greater poverty and higher unemployment 
discouraged people from voting. These results together with the 
finding for uneducated people, suggests that disadvantaged people 
tended to vote in smaller proportions.
• The presence of immigrants had a negative and statistically signifi-
cant impact on turnout, though quite small.
• Finally, even after controlling for the socio-economic variables, 
turnout was significantly lower in Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
London (in the strongholds of ‘remain’) than in England excluding 
London.
The regression fit is also remarkably strong for the turnout equation. 
The coefficient of determination is 0.82 for the first model in Table 5 
and Figure 42 shows that the fit by the model tracks actual voter behav-
iour quite well.
87 | AN ANATOMY OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH IN EUROPE
Table 5: Regression estimate for the determinants of turnout 
M
od
el
 
E
M
od
el
 
F
M
od
el
 
G
M
od
el
 
H
Share of population aged 20-34 -0.62 -0.48    
  [-10.0] [-8.0]    
Share of population aged 65 and over 0.47 0.44
[5.7] [5.7]
Share of population with a degree 0.36   0.25  
  [8.5]   [5.3]  
Share of population without qualification -0.4 -0.4
[-7.9] [-6.9]
Disposable income per inhabitant -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00
  [-1.6] [1.2] [-0.7] [0.3]
Gini coefficient of income inequality 0.32 0.32 0.51 0.51
[2.1] [2.1] [2.9] [3.1]
Poverty rate -0.36 -0.15 -0.30 -0.07
  [-2.1] [-0.8] [-1.5] [-0.4]
Unemployment rate -0.44 -0.31 -0.72 -0.49
[-4.0] [-2.6] [-6.0] [-4.0]
Share of non-UK born population -0.10 -0.12 -0.16 -0.16
  [-2.7] [-3.2] [-3.7] [-3.8]
Scotland -5.47 -5.09 -5.88 -5.41
[-9.6] [-8.7] [-9.0] [-8.6]
Northern Ireland -8.04 -6.66 -7.76 -6.46
  [-6.9] [-5.6] [-5.7] [-5.0]
Wales -1.02 -0.38 -1.82 -1.23
[-1.4] [-0.5] [-2.2] [-1.6]
London -2.78 -2.27 -3.08 -3.00
  [-1.8] [-1.4] [-1.7] [-1.7]
adjusted R2 0.82 0.81 0.75 0.78
Source: Bruegel. Note: the sample includes the cross section of the 173 UK regions; 
t-ratios are reported in brackets below the point estimates; the regression includes a 
constant too. A parameter estimate is significantly different from zero at 10 percent 
significance level if the absolute value of the t-ratio is larger than 1.7.
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Figure 42: Turnout in the 173 UK regions and the fitted values by the estimated 
regression 
Source: Bruegel. Note: regions from 1-133 are from England, regions from 134-145 are 
from Wales, regions from 146-168 are from Scotland and regions from 169-173 are from 
Northern Ireland. Inner London is from 80-88, while outer London is from 89-100. The 
first regression (Model E) of Table 5 is used. 
Brief summary and implications for inclusive growth
Using a regression analysis based on hard data from statistical offices 
(as opposed to using the results of opinion surveys) for 173 UK regions, 
our results confirm that younger and better educated people voted 
for ‘remain’ in greater proportions and older and uneducated people 
tended to vote for ‘leave’. There was a clear geographical pattern in 
which Scotland, Northern Ireland and London were for ‘remain’. The 
actual presence of immigrants did not have a significant effect on 
the results, supporting conjecture of Mourlon-Druol (2016) that it 
was the perception that immigration could be a problem, rather than 
their actual presence, that influenced the vote. Average household 
income did not play a role either, as we control for several socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the regions. Turnout was lower among 
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disadvantaged people and in areas belonging to the strongholds of 
‘remain’: the young and residents of Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
London voted in lower proportions. 
Despite the clear overall vote for ‘leave’, EU leaders may read a pos-
itive message from the referendum result: the young (who will dom-
inate the population in the coming decades) and the well-educated 
(who may be able to understand better the benefits of EU integration) 
were more in favour of EU membership.
A key contribution of our calculations is to show with regression 
analysis that in areas where inequality and poverty are higher, there 
were more ‘leave’ votes, even after controlling for the influences of 
socio-economic and geographic factors. This finding calls for more 
inclusive growth. In the UK, income inequality – a key indicator 
of inclusive growth – is almost the highest in the European Union. 
Theresa May, the new UK prime minister, has rightly emphasised very 
strongly the importance of a social reform to reduce the inequality of 
opportunities (Asthana et al, 2016).
Overall, high inequality and poverty undermine personal well-be-
ing and social cohesion, and can also boost protest votes in referenda 
and elections. This is another key lesson that politicians in other coun-
tries should learn from the Brexit vote.
Data description
We use a cross section data for the 173 NUTS3 (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics, 3rd level) regions of the UK. Data sources 
and transformations were the following:
Referendum results: the dependent variable in the regressions 
reported in Table 4, included as % of ‘leave’ votes. The other dependent 
variable is the % turnout (Table 5). The Electoral Commission pro-
vides results for 382 UK regions, of which Northern Ireland is a single 
region. Gibraltar, a very small territory of the UK, is also among the 382 
regions. With the exception of Northern Ireland and Gibraltar, we used 
the local authority districts (LAD) to NUTS3 region mapping of the 
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Office for National Statistics to calculate the referendum results for the 
NUTS3 regions. There is an unambiguous mapping between the LADs 
and NUTS3 with the exception of three Scottish LADs, for which we 
distributed the votes as half-half (when an LAD was part of two NUTS3 
regions) and third-third-third (when an LAD was part of three NUTS3 
regions). Northern Ireland has five NUTS3 regions. We found a break-
down of results for 18 Northern Ireland constituencies at BBC that we 
approximated to the five NUTS3 regions using maps. 
Share of young (from 20-34 years) and old (65 years and older): 
included in the regression as the % of resident population. The source 
is Eurostat’s ‘Population on 1 January by five year age group, sex and 
NUTS 3 region [demo_r_pjangrp3]’ dataset.
Education: included in the regression as the % of working age pop-
ulation. For England and Wales the source is ‘Table KS501EW, 2011 
Census: Qualifications and students, local authorities in England and 
Wales’ from the Office for National Statistics. For Scotland the source is 
Scottish Statistics for qualifications of working age adults, also for 2011. 
For Northern Ireland the source is the ‘Labour Force Survey Local Area 
Database’ of the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Servic 
(NINIS), also for 2011.
Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per head at current 
basic prices: included in the regression as the UK average = 100. The 
source is Office for National Statistics for all UK’s NUTS3 regions. 
Non-UK born resident population: included in the regression as % 
of resident population. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) pro-
vides detailed regional data for England, Wales and Scotland, plus 
the total for Northern Ireland. For Northern Ireland, NUTS3 data is 
provided by the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service 
(NINIS). However, since the total for Northern Ireland as reported by 
ONS and by NINIS are different, for consistency, we adjusted propor-
tionally the NINIS data to match the aggregate data provided by ONS. 
For England, Wales and Scotland data is available at the local authority 
districts (LAD) level: to calculate aggregates at the NUTS3 level, we 
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added up the number of non-UK born residents and the total number 
of residents for each NUTS3 region and calculated the ratio of non-UK 
born resident population from these aggregates.
Gini coefficient of income inequality (after taxes and transfers) in 
2011: included in the regression as %. The source is the Regional Well-
Being dataset of the OECD. This data is available for the 12 UK NUTS1 
regions and therefore we use the same value for each NUTS3 region 
within a NUTS1 region.
Poverty rate (after taxes and transfers) in 2011 - Regional headcount 
ratios for disposable income, with poverty line set at 50% of the national 
median income: included in the regression as %. The source is the 
Regional Well-Being dataset of the OECD. This data is available for the 
12 UK NUTS1 regions and therefore we use the same value for each 
NUTS3 region within a NUTS1 region.
Unemployment rate in 2014: included in the regression as %. The 
sources are Office for National Statistics for England and Wales; 
Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service (NINIS) for 
Northern Ireland and The Scottish Government for Scotland. Data is 
available at the local authority districts (LAD) level: to calculate aggre-
gates at the NUTS3 level, we added up the number of unemployed 
people and the number of people in the labour force for each NUTS3 
region and calculated the unemployment rate from these aggregates.
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Annex 2: Further indicators of 
income and wealth inequality
In this annex we report additional indicators on income and wealth 
inequality. 
Income quantile distribution shows a relatively similar pattern 
across the EU with the lowest quantile having the least share on aver-
age around 7.7 percent, while the fifth quantile on average equals 38.7 
percent (Figure 43). The combined share of the second, third and the 
fourth quantile is on average 53.6 percent across the EU. In Romania, 
Bulgaria, Spain and the Baltic states the share of income of the first 
quantile is the lowest from 5.6 percent to 6.5 percent, while in Cyprus, 
Bulgaria and Portugal more than 40 percent of the national income is 
allocated to the fifth quantile. 
S80/S20 ratio displays the same pattern of inequality as the income 
share ratios (Figure 44). Romania, Bulgaria, the three Baltic countries 
and southern EU countries have the highest levels of inequality, while 
the Czech Republic, Finland and Slovenia have the least income quan-
tile discrepancy.
The average ratio for EU countries is 5.2, which is similar to the 
levels of Korea and Japan, however the EU figure is much lower com-
pared to the US and Turkey, where the ratio is around 8. 
Additional useful indicators for uncovering inequality develop-
ments are the top ten and one percent income shares. Figure 45 shows 
the evolution of the income share (excluding capital gains) of the top 
ten percent, while Figure 46 shows the income share of the percent 
since the 1960s. Both figures seem to exhibit the same patterns. While 
Figure 43: Income distribution by quintiles, 2015 
Source: Eurostat. Note: (*) Data for 2014 instead of 2015.
Figure 44: S80/S20 Income quintile share ratio, 2015 
Source: Eurostat, OECD. Note: S80/S20 is the ratio of total income received by the top 
20 percent of the population (top quintile) against an income received by the bottom 
20 percent of the population (bottom quintile). All incomes are equivalised disposable 
incomes (income after tax and other deductions). (*) data for 2014, (**) data for 2013.
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the US, UK, Italy and Germany are characterised by an upward trend, 
namely an increase of the top ten and top one income share over time, 
France and Spain present a flatter evolution. 
A vital dimension of inequality is wealth distribution. While mean 
gross income obviously increases as net wealth goes up (Figure 47), the 
differences are actually much larger when looking at wealth distribu-
tion (Figure 48). Net wealth concentration at the top ten percent of net 
wealth distribution is extremely high. 
Figure 45: Top 10 percent income share in total national income, 1960-2014
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database. Note: Income share excluding 
capital gains. 
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Figure 46: Top 1 percent income share in total national income, 1960-2014
Source: The World Wealth and Income Database. Note: Income share excluding 
capital gains. 
Figure 47: Mean gross income by net wealth group, 2011
Source: The Eurosystem Household and Finance Consumption Survey (HFCS); European 
Central Bank. Note: The HFCS only provides data for the EU countries included in the graph.
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
19
60
19
62
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
20
12
20
14
China France Germany Italy
Japan Spain UK US
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
A
u
st
ri
a
B
el
gi
u
m
C
yp
ru
s
Fi
n
la
n
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
It
al
y
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
M
al
ta
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
P
or
tu
ga
l
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sp
ai
n

ou
sa
n
d 
€
Bottom 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-90% 90-100%
96 | BRUEGEL BLUEPRINT 26
Figure 48: Mean net wealth by net wealth groups, 2011
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
A
u
st
ri
a
B
el
gi
u
m
C
yp
ru
s
Fi
n
la
n
d
Fr
an
ce
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
It
al
y
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
M
al
ta
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
P
or
tu
ga
l
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
Sp
ai
n

ou
sa
n
d 
€
Bottom 20% 20-40% 40-60% 60-80% 80-90% 90-100%
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European Central Bank. Note: The HFCS only provides data for the EU countries 
included in the graph.
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With only seven percent of the world’s people but about half of its 
welfare payments, the European Union’s levels of inequality and absolute 
poverty are low in a global context. Nevertheless, unemployment remains 
high in a number of EU countries, while the intergenerational divide 
between the young and the old has widened. Social mobility is weak, in 
particular in the more unequal economies of southern Europe, limiting 
opportunities for the children of poor and disadvantaged families.
Striving for fairness in economic development is crucial in order for 
societies to be stable and citizens not to feel disenchanted. This volume 
sets out to inform the debate around inequality with a comprehensive 
breakdown of relevant indicators and comparisons, which together provide 
an anatomy of inclusive growth in the EU.
Although there are EU-level objectives related to reducing inequality, 
the policies needed to meet the objectives – dealing with education and 
welfare and tax systems, for example – are in the hands of national poli-
ticians. The EU can highlight best practices and apply peer pressure to its 
member countries, but this volume contains a warning: promising results 
without proper instruments could backfire and lead to a backlash against 
the EU if citizens perceive that promises are not being kept.
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